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Article 
Categorizing Student Speech 
Alexander Tsesis† 
  INTRODUCTION   
One of the greatest complexities of free speech doctrine in-
volves distinguishing between constitutionally protected com-
munications and those that the Supreme Court considers outside 
the First Amendment’s protective purview. This dichotomy is 
sharply pronounced in cases reviewing public school restrictions 
on student digital, verbal, and written statements. Courts jum-
ble the precedents by sometimes treating students as civic par-
ticipants and other times treating them as immature wards. 
Lack of consistency in this area of law has created circuit splits 
over when school administrators may constitutionally punish 
student speech that occurs inside or outside the school. This Ar-
ticle explains the contextual balance required to correct the in-
ternal conflicts between jurisprudence that recognizes students 
retain First Amendment rights at school and a different line of 
case law that deferentially affirms school censorship without 
subjecting it to exacting scrutiny.1 
The Court has recently qualified core student speech prece-
dents rather than overturning them outright. A student’s right 
to express personal opinions, artistic acumen, or political in-
sights remains sacrosanct, but as of late the Court has taken a 
decidedly less speech-protective analytical direction, and lower 
 
†  Raymond & Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of 
Law, Loyola University Chicago College of Law. I owe debts of gratitude to En-
rique Armijo, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Marc Blitz, Katie Eyer, David Han, Randy 
Kozel, Toni Massaro, Mollie McKinley, David Thaw, and Andrew Tutt. I am 
grateful for the opportunity to workshop this paper at the Yale Freedom of Ex-
pression Scholars Conference. Copyright © 2018 by Alexander Tsesis. 
 1. For earlier works on K–12 speech doctrine see, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, 
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987); CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: 
HOW SCHOOLS AND COURTS SUBVERT STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
(2015); Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehen-
sive Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395 (2011); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student 
Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027 (2008). 
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courts have followed its lead. A majority of justices have become 
increasingly deferential to school administrators’ judgments to 
censor expressive content about matters such as drug policy and 
raunchy political school speeches. The judicial trend is to be cat-
egorical about the content of speech that school districts, princi-
pals, and teachers can prohibit and to be less rigorous of the ev-
idence educators must provide courts to justify adverse actions 
against students. 
The Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on school officials’ 
judgments has legitimized less rigorous review of cases challeng-
ing the suppression of student expression, rather than demand-
ing that the officials rigorously hold to First Amendment princi-
ples. The Court has repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness 
to closely scrutinize school boards’ disciplinary measures im-
posed on students for the manner and substance of their expres-
sions, emboldening state legislators to adopt harsh disciplinary 
laws against student speech.2 Many of the statutes rely on am-
biguous terms, including “boisterous conduct”3 and “disturb-
ance,”4 granting school administrators broad, ad hoc discretion-
ary powers, rather than limiting them to narrowly tailored 
restrictions on free speech. Lower court judges have also em-
braced the Court’s increasingly lenient student speech doctrine, 
consigning to educators broad latitude to make policies about 
which pupil expressions are appropriate.5 
Judicial reliance on rigid categories to identify protected 
student speech reflects a broader trend in First Amendment ju-
risprudence. The Roberts Court has spearheaded a categorical 
approach to free speech analysis.6 Its stated methodology relies 
on a historical framework that is purportedly rooted in principles 
existing at the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791.7 Upon 
 
 2. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911 (2016); CAL. EDUC. CODE  
§ 32210 (West 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-06-16 (2016). 
 3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-06-16 (2016) (“It is a class B misdemeanor for 
any person to . . . willfully interfere with or interrupt the proper order or man-
agement of a public school by . . . boisterous conduct.”). 
 4. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32210 (2014) (titled “willful disturbance of public 
school or meeting, offense”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-06-16 (2016) (titled “Dis-
turbance of a public school-penalty”). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (adopting a historical 
and traditional approach to identifying low level speech and denying to the leg-
islature any “freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside 
the scope of the First Amendment”). 
 7. Id. at 468. 
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closer examination, however, the evolution of free speech juris-
prudence has been more nuanced and contextual than the listing 
of unprotected forms of communication.8 Since 2010, the Court 
has articulated an absolutist-sounding free speech doctrine that 
prohibits judges from engaging in ad hoc balancing of social is-
sues. In this context, the Court has identified a limited number 
of speech categories that it regards to be historically unprotected 
forms of communication.9 
Student speech has never been among those categories the 
Court has included in its unprotected list. To the contrary, stu-
dents have traditionally been found to retain their right of self-
expression even during school hours.10 They are young citizens, 
finding their individual voices, and contributing to public de-
bates, if only in their academic niches. Consequently, the Court 
has historically been skeptical of censorship, except in those 
cases involving students who have substantially disrupted the 
educational environment or materially interfered with others’ 
rights.11 Increasingly, however, students’ ability to express con-
troversial opinions has been jeopardized by a pattern of judicial 
deference to school administrators. Some district and appellate 
courts afford minimal constitutional protections to students who 
use off-campus computers to post hyperbolic comments that are 
later read or viewed on campus through social media websites.12 
 
 8. See Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech Doctrine and Con-
textualization, 65 EMORY L.J. 495, 506–14 (2015) (arguing that while the Court 
claims to be relying on history and tradition to identify low value speech, the 
actual categories the Court relies on are based on carefully balanced policy con-
siderations). 
 9. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (“[C]ontent-based 
restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when con-
fined to the ‘historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to 
the bar.’” (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)). 
 10. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) 
(“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”). 
 11. Id. at 513. 
 12. Compare Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 398–400 (5th 
Cir. 2015) (holding that the school board’s approved punishment for a threaten-
ing rap song recorded off campus but intimidating the targeted teacher at school 
did not violate the student’s right of free speech), and S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. 
Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that a 
preliminary injunction was inappropriately granted to students who had cre-
ated an off-campus racist website to be read by classmates, which school officials 
could have reasonably expected to impact school activities), with J.S. ex rel. 
Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932–33 (3d Cir. 2011) (hold-
ing that school officials cannot suspend a student for off-campus speech because 
a different student brought a copy of the communication to school). 
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This judicial trend has emboldened officials to police the content 
of student expressions without complying with heightened re-
view of disciplinary decisions.13 
Officials typically make disciplinary decisions based on le-
gitimate desires to advance learning and the safety of students. 
However, without adequate judicial oversight to ensure that 
school restrictions do not compromise free speech values, courts 
leave too much room for restricting personal or political views to 
the sole discretion of teachers, principals, and school boards. Ad-
ministrators’ educational expertise certainly exceeds those of or-
dinary judges; however, the judiciary remains the foremost au-
thority on constitutional interpretation. Final determination 
about the constitutionality of speech limitations should therefore 
remain the province of courts. Without heightened First Amend-
ment scrutiny, student communications are left at the behest of 
subjective administrative judgments that broadly vary from 
school district to school district and from principal to principal. 
Safeguarding students’ abilities to openly explore controver-
sial public subjects, to express themselves artistically, and to 
learn valuable information requires a fine-tuned standard of ju-
dicial review. This Article argues: (1) that any restriction on stu-
dent political speech expressed outside a school sponsored event, 
class, or assembly, should be subject to strict scrutiny; and (2) 
where speech is within the auspices of schools, courts should ap-
ply a contextual form of intermediate scrutiny to review censor-
ship decisions. 
Part I provides doctrinal background for evaluating re-
strictions on student speech. It details the marked transfor-
mation of student speech doctrine from Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School District,14 in which the Court 
scrutinized the administration’s actions, to Morse v. Frederick,15 
in which the Court largely deferred to the administration. Part 
II turns to the categorical speech doctrine, explaining its roots in 
United States v. Stevens16 and its progeny. These cases formal-
ized free speech analysis outside the realm of student speech, 
narrowing the classes of expression beyond the pale of First 
Amendment protections. Although the Court did not list derisive 
student speech among the low-value categories, the Court’s re-
 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 15. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 16. 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
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cent erosion of the Tinker doctrine has effectively rendered stu-
dent communications among those few whose content can be 
suppressed without being subject to strict scrutiny review. After 
exploring Supreme Court precedents, Part II then turns to re-
cent lower court opinions extending schools’ discretionary au-
thority to police contemporary technologies such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and email servers. The discussion deals with on-campus 
and off-campus communications of intimidation, incitement, 
threat, cyber-bullying, and hyperbole. 
Part III develops a framework for adjudicating school regu-
lations that impose substantial burdens on student communica-
tions. The proposed approach is significantly more nuanced and 
contextual than the current ad hoc test judges have relied on to 
evaluate educators’ and administrators’ decisions. It proffers a 
three-tiered approach. In discussions of ideas, self-assertion, and 
political speech, stated in the playground, near the school, by 
lockers, and other unstructured activities, courts should use 
strict scrutiny analysis. In circumstances, where limitations on 
students are created to advance certain content-neutral time, 
place, and manner concerns, the intermediate scrutiny standard 
is appropriate. Finally, officials should be granted the greatest 
discretion when dealing with speech that is neither political nor 
informational, such as obscenity, true threats, and plagiarism. 
This balanced method of review maintains the intellectual space 
for students to develop into thoughtful adults and to engage in 
social discourse while retaining sufficient discretion for pedagog-
ical discipline. Balancing does not succumb to oversimplified cat-
egories; therefore, in some circumstances schools might identify 
other constitutional interests that outweigh student expression. 
Illustrative of the latter point are narrowly tailored rules against 
wearing confederate symbols in schools to administer the Thir-
teenth Amendment’s injunction against the badges of slavery. In 
any case, student First Amendment rights can be better secured 
through contextual analysis rather than by categorical framing. 
I.  SCHOOL SPEECH DOCTRINE   
Recognizing that constitutional protection of free speech ap-
plies equally to youths as it does to adults, early Supreme Court 
precedents on student speech robustly protected students who 
wished to express controversial viewpoints at schools. Youths 
communicate about matters at the core of the First Amendment, 
including topics on deliberative democracy, personal develop-
ment, and informative facts. However, the school speech doctrine 
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has gradually eroded to diminish student autonomy and to ex-
pand educators’ prerogatives over administrative suppression of 
statements and opinions. This Part discusses the most im-
portant Supreme Court precedents establishing the student 
speech doctrine. Initially, in Tinker, the Court set a clearly de-
fined test, prohibiting schools from restricting student speech 
unless it caused a substantial disruption.17 However, the more 
recent opinions of Fraser and Morse rely on ad hoc tests of vul-
garity and illegality, without requiring proof of disruption.18 The 
later cases augmented school administrators’ authority to censor 
unconventional student views, while stifling student opposition 
to school policies or to existing law. The Morse majority went so 
far as to sanction a principal’s exercise of disciplinary authority 
against students who displayed a sign on the sidewalk across the 
street from the school.19 
The seminal case on the constitutional status of student 
speech, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, arose from complaints filed against school officials who 
had attempted to ban political speech on campuses.20 In 1965, as 
the United States was building up military forces in Vietnam,21 
several adults and children met in Des Moines, Iowa and agreed 
to wear black armbands in civil protest of the expanded U.S. in-
volvement in that armed conflict. Among them were two high 
school students and one elementary school student.22 
Determined to stop the children from protesting at school, 
principals throughout the city committed to a joint policy of pre-
venting students from wearing armbands.23 As a result, officials 
suspended the three students for refusing demands to remove 
the insignia at school.24 All of them testified at trial that wearing 
the armbands signaled sorrow at the loss of life and support for 
 
 17. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 18. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986); Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408–10 (2007). 
 19. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408–10. 
 20. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 21. JONATHAN COLMAN, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON 52–
53 (2010) (discussing the rapid expansion of the number of U.S. troops in Vi-
etnam between 1965 and 1966); YAACOV VERTZBERGER, RISK TAKING AND DE-
CISIONMAKING 265 (1998) (“In a television broadcast on July 28, 1965, Johnson 
announced that additional U.S. troops would be sent to fight in South Vi-
etnam.”). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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a truce in Vietnam.25 The prohibition prevented students from 
expressing their ideas on a significant public debate. 
The Supreme Court majority in Tinker held that the suspen-
sion violated the students’ constitutional rights to free speech.26 
In one of the most insightful and influential statements, Justice 
Abe Fortas wrote that students do not “shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.”27 The students wore armbands both as a personal protest 
against U.S. engagement in the Vietnam conflict and to influ-
ence others’ thinking on the matter: these were self-assertive 
acts protected by the Free Speech Clause.28 As a rule, school au-
thorities can only rely on neutral criteria—such as time, place, 
and manner,29 or limited public-forum restrictions30—to punish 
students for demonstrative expressions. In the key portion of the 
case, the Court ruled that school administrators can order stu-
dents to desist from expressive behavior that “materially dis-
rupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of 
the rights of others.”31 For half a century, that has been the abid-
ing law of free speech at public schools; although, subsequent 
case law has narrowed its initial breadth of protection for K–12 
students’ free speech.32 
Given the importance of obtaining instruction and express-
ing personal views, school suppression of speech can only be un-
dertaken upon the school’s proof that the student “substantially 
interfere[d] with the work of the school or impinge[d] upon the 
rights of other students.”33 Merely creating audience “discomfort 
or unpleasantness“34 by expressing unpopular views is not 
 
 25. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 
(S.D. Iowa 1966), rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 26. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14. 
 27. Id. at 506. 
 28. Id. at 514. 
 29. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116–19 (1972) (uphold-
ing, under the First Amendment, an anti-noise regulation, tailored for the par-
ticular needs of an educational institution, creating neutral restrictions for pro-
tests conducted on sidewalks adjacent to a school). 
 30. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111–12 (2001) 
(holding “that speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be ex-
cluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed 
from a religious viewpoint”). 
 31. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 32. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
 33. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 34. Id. at 509. 
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enough for school authorities to interfere with a fundamental lib-
erty.35 In Tinker, the school failed to demonstrate that by wear-
ing armbands the students had materially and substantially dis-
rupted school activities.36 Justice Fortas made clear that school 
officials do not have unbridled authority to determine whether 
there has been substantial disruption; rather, courts must rely 
on independent judgment to evaluate whether the evidence suf-
ficiently justifies the suppression of student expression.37 In 
Tinker, the Court evaluated the record, finding no “evidence that 
the school authorities had reason to anticipate”38 that by wear-
ing armbands, students would substantially interfere with 
learning.39 This was not merely a rational basis of review, but a 
close scrutiny of the school’s decision to interfere with students’ 
right of free speech by setting content or viewpoint restrictions 
on expression. 
Tinker contributed a variety of insights into the school 
speech area. For example, students retain constitutional rights 
even when they express messages contrary to those favored by 
school authorities.40 Public school officials fall under the Four-
teenth Amendment definition of state actors.41 They cannot con-
duct themselves outside the parameters of constitutional guar-
antees, without regard to students’ maturity and inexperience. 
Justice Fortas further wrote for the majority that totalitarian 
authority over students has no place in public schools.42 The 
state must respect the fundamental right of free speech; stu-
dents are not merely the recipients of communications but are at 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 514. 
 37. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights 
at the Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 533–34 
(2000) (“[I]t is not for a court to accept the claims of school officials about the 
need to stop the speech; the court must independently review the facts and de-
termine whether there is sufficient evidence of significant disruptive effect to 
justify punishing expression.”); C. Thomas Dienes & Annemargaret Connolly, 
When Students Speak: Judicial Review in the Academic Marketplace, 7 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 343, 359 (1989) (“[T]he Court demands substantial governmental 
justification for the burdens that school officials impose on student speech.”). 
 38. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 506 (“In order for the state in the person of school officials to jus-
tify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show 
that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular view-
point.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 511. 
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liberty to express their sentiments without first receiving official 
approval.43 Judge Fortas’ statement that the marketplace of 
ideas requires “vigilant protection . . . in the community of Amer-
ican schools”44 is tied to the democratic model of education.45 
This view of public education elaborated the same principles that 
informed the Brown v. Board of Education opinion, where Chief 
Justice Warren stressed that public schools awaken “the child to 
cultural values.”46 To this point, Tinker adds that students con-
tribute to culture and education.47 Education, therefore, benefits 
democratic learning and democratic engagement. 
Following the creation of this integrative conception of stu-
dent speech as an instrument essential to education and child-
hood development, the Court gradually beveled away at the 
moorings of Tinker, becoming increasingly deferential to school 
authorities. Beginning with Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser,48 the Court regularly created categories of presumed 
lower value student speech and did not apply the Tinker stand-
ard to them. With changes to Court membership having shifted 
the institution in a more conservative direction, the Fraser ma-
jority accepted a school’s imposition of punishment for verbal 
communication.49 The high school student had been disciplined 
for a nominating speech on behalf of a fellow student that was 
delivered at a high school assembly, attended by students as 
young as fourteen years of age.50 It contained “an elaborate, 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967)). 
 45. Id. Among the purposes of democratic education is the development of 
good character, the imparting of moral reasoning, the engagement with delib-
erative participation. See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 50–52 
(1987). 
 46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 47. That flexible protection of liberties, among which speech is only one, 
has a broad range of implications about other constitutional limits on school 
officials on matters like school searches; although, the Supreme Court has been 
quite deferential to their uses of authority. While Tinker heralded an expansion 
of constitutional protections for student free speech, this expansion did not 
translate into other areas such as school search and seizure nor into admin-
istration of corporal punishments. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 
(1985) (finding that in a school setting, reasonableness, rather than probable 
cause, suffices for a school purse search); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 
(1977) (holding that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not apply 
to school settings and common law state protections safeguard students’ due 
process interests). 
 48. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 49. Id. at 685. 
 50. Id. at 677. 
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graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor,”51 which teachers had 
warned the speaker were inappropriate and might subject him 
to disciplinary censure.52 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
Burger acknowledged the “undoubted freedom to advocate un-
popular and controversial views in schools and classrooms,” but 
stressed that value “must be balanced against the society’s coun-
tervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of so-
cially appropriate behavior.”53 Justice Burger gave wide latitude 
to schools, adopting the perspective of historians who had argued 
that public education inculcates “habits and manners of civility 
as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispen-
sable to the practice of self-government in the community and 
the nation.”54 
Justice Burger differentiated the case from Tinker, where 
the ability to express political views had been at stake.55 On the 
other hand, in Fraser, the public school undertook “to prohibit 
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”56 By 
this explanation, the Court acceded to school officials’ content-
based censorship. The holding is understandable, in large part 
because the speech sparked a reaction from the use of vulgar 
gestures during a speech presented at a school function. Even 
the high value of free speech, Justice Burger found, did not re-
quire educators to abandon their responsibility for students’ 
character developed in the face public misbehavior.57 Such an 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 677–78. 
 53. Id. at 681. 
 54. Id. (quoting CHARLES BEARD, MARY BEARD & WILLIAM BEARD, NEW 
BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1960)). The connection between ed-
ucation and good habits is in fact ancient in Anglo-American culture. See, e.g., 
Etna, 8 F. Cas. 803, 804 (D. Me. 1838) (“The community has a deep interest in 
preserving the rectitude of the young, and in imparting to them such an educa-
tion and training them to such habits as will render them in manhood useful 
and not pernicious members of society.”); 1 MARIA EDGEWORTH & R. L. EDGE-
WORTH, PRACTICAL EDUCATION 334 (2d ed. 1801) (“As the understanding un-
folds we should fortify all our pupils’ good habits, and virtuous enthusiasm, by 
the conviction of their utility, of their being essential to the happiness of society 
in general, and conducive immediately to the happiness of every individual.”); 
T.C. FOSTER, A VERBATIM REPORT OF THE GREAT DIOCESAN MEETING AT WAR-
RINGTON 44 (1839) (asserting that it is the duty of school masters to instill “good 
dispositions, good habits, good principles, good conduct, founded on religious 
motives”). 
 55. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
 56. Id. at 676. 
 57. Id. at 685–86. 
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approach empowers school officials to maintain an orderly learn-
ing environment at school sponsored events without substantial 
disruption. These conclusions are in line with Tinker. However, 
there is reason to question the Court’s perfunctory acceptance of 
the Bethel School Board’s characterization of events. 
While the indecency may have been clear to the Fraser ma-
jority, the evidence does not seem to have been at all so conclu-
sive. The court of appeals, to the contrary, found that only three 
students of an assembly of six hundred students were boisterous 
and that the education process was not at all disrupted.58 At 
trial, a school counselor testified that the level of student re-
sponse was not out of the ordinary in these sorts of assemblies.59 
The district court, “applying the variable test for obscenity as to 
high school students,”60 had found that the speech was “not ob-
scene” for the high school audience.61 
Ordinarily speakers may purposefully resort to expletives 
and perhaps even vulgarities to make a public point about any-
thing from a presidential election to a military policy. Given the 
potential for officials to suppress students’ core speech rights, 
judicial oversight remains essential to safeguard constitutional 
values. Judges should deal with specific counterclaims of expres-
sion and disruption rather than dismissing out of hand factual 
findings of the trial court. The Court’s understandable skittish-
ness against acting as a super-school board does not gainsay the 
judiciary’s constitutional obligation to demand a school to fur-
nish rigorous proof of disruption in a matter implicating political 
speech. To provide more guidance to schools and lower court 
judges, the Fraser Court might have more clearly limited the 
holding to vulgar statements at public assemblies or at school 
functions with young children present, thereby recognizing that 
not all sexual innuendo used by students is actionable by high 
schools.62 
 
 58. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 59. Id. at 1359. 
 60. Brief for Respondents, E.L. Fraser at 12, Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (No. 84-1667), 1985 WL 670006 *29. 
 61. Id. 
 62. There is some indication that the Court means its holding to be limited: 
“A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit mono-
logue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.” Fraser, 
478 U.S. at 685. However, the Court also uses broader discretionary language 
that would indicate broader school official powers: “The First Amendment does 
not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and 
lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educa-
tional mission.” Id. 
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Following Fraser, the Court doubled down on its deference 
to school administrators in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier,63 approving administrative censorship of students 
who sought to publish articles about social issues in a school 
newspaper.64 Hazelwood arose after a high school principal re-
fused to permit the publication of two stories.65 One story dealt 
with teenage pregnancy and the other with the developmental 
adjustment of children after parental divorce.66 Any state prohi-
bition against publishing such content in an ordinary newspaper 
would have certainly violated free speech doctrine against prior 
restraints of the press.67 
The principal openly admitted that the decision to deny pub-
lication was content based.68 Arguably at least, the topic of preg-
nancy may have been inappropriate for some younger students. 
The Court found the principal might have “reasonably been con-
cerned” that parents and boyfriends discussed in the article had 
not been given the opportunity to respond to sensitive charges.69 
Although the pregnant students who were discussed in the story 
were pseudonymous, the principal was concerned members of 
the school community might recognize their real identities.70 
Nevertheless, the Court’s rationale contained phrasing that cut 
into students’ expressive interests. 
While the Hazelwood Court continued to quote the Tinker 
statement that students did not give up all their free speech 
rights at school, the majority found that public school students’ 
First Amendment rights “are not automatically coextensive with 
the rights of adults in other settings.”71 The Hazelwood majority 
deferred to educators, treating student speech on subjects of in-
 
 63. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988). 
 64. Id. at 276. 
 65. Id. at 263. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (asserting that 
prior restraint is “the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First 
Amendment rights”); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 
(1971) (per curiam) (“‘Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this 
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’” (quot-
ing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963))). 
 68. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263 (stating the various content-based reasons 
the principal denied publication of the two articles). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 263. 
 71. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 
682 (1986)). 
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terest to student journalists and readers as being low-value com-
munications, asserting “what manner of speech in the classroom 
or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the 
school board.”72 This pithy statement signaled a remarkable as-
signment of judicial power to interpret the Constitution to edu-
cators. School officials, the majority found, are entitled to regu-
late the newspaper content without even being subject to the 
rigors of intermediate, much less, strict scrutiny.73 The Court 
sought to distinguish school-sponsored newspaper stories from 
the armband protest of Tinker,74 even though both were about 
controversial subjects disapproved of by school officials. The rea-
soning in Hazelwood nevertheless expanded school officials’ pow-
ers to discriminate on the basis of content and viewpoint low-
value speech by a mere showing of reasonableness.75 The major-
ity made clear that it regarded student speech in school-created 
fora to be a separate category of First Amendment doctrine.76 
The Hazelwood reliance on rational scrutiny demonstrated 
the Supreme Court’s increased willingness to defer to public of-
ficials’ discretion over student expressions, even when strictures 
overtly suppress contents and viewpoints. The succeeding case 
was even more deferential to school authorities. Morse v. Fred-
erick, which the Court decided in 2007, did not involve speech at 
school, nor a column in a school newspaper.77 The school sus-
pended Joseph Frederick for displaying a large banner with, 
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” and refusing the school principal’s re-
quest to furl it.78 The offending students planned the protest to 
coincide with the Olympic torch passing by the school and hoped 
their stunt would thereby garner press coverage.79 Frederick dis-
played the messages on the sidewalk across from the school.80 At 
no point during the display did he enter school grounds.81 Find-
ing herself rebuffed by Frederick’s recalcitrance, the principal 
walked off the school grounds, across the street, grabbed the 
 
 72. Id. at 267 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683). 
 73. Id. at 276. 
 74. Id. at 270–71. 
 75. Id. at 274. 
 76. Id. at 273 (“This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that 
the education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, 
teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges.”). 
 77. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007). 
 78. Id. at 397–98. 
 79. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 80. Id. at 1115. 
 81. Id. 
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sign, and then suspended him from school for advocating illegal 
drug use.82 Her administrative action was an undeniable form of 
subject and viewpoint discrimination, which under ordinary cir-
cumstances would have warranted strict scrutiny review. 
The principal read into Frederick’s message. At oral argu-
ment, Justice Souter suggested that the student might have 
been making a political statement, calling for the legalization of 
marijuana, but not for its use by students.83 On the other hand, 
the statement might have been a parody84 or public commen-
tary,85 both of which Tinker indicates are protected at school 
and, even more so, outside of it. In his dissent, Justice Stevens 
also recognized this point, asserting that allowing a principal to 
suspend the student for an “obtuse reference to marijuana,” the 
advocacy of which “was at best subtle and ambiguous,” over-
broad, with “no stopping point” to prevent the school from fur-
ther encroaching on speech.86 
Despite the inherent ambiguity of Frederick’s four-word 
message, the speculation as to its meaning, the parody of it, and 
the political debate it might have engendered, Chief Justice Rob-
erts, writing for the majority in Morse, did not engage in height-
ened scrutiny. Instead, he accepted the principal’s assessment 
without adequately balancing Frederick’s claim to free expres-
sion.87 The Court’s rational basis approach might have made 
sense had Frederick caused a substantial disruption of school, 
but nothing of the type appears from the record. Rather than de-
manding the principal to provide compelling or substantial rea-
sons for punishing a student for speech in a traditional public 
forum, a locus where the Court has long recognized the need for 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Frederick v. Morse, 551 U.S. 393 
(2007) (No. 06-278), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/2006/06-278.pdf. 
 84. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (finding the 
First Amendment protects parody). 
 85. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (asserting that “[t]he pol-
icy of the First Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion” on 
public matters). 
 86. Morse, 551 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 87. See id. at 408–10 (noting that the principal’s actions were justified be-
cause of the dangers of drug use); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 
2550 (2012) (“Freedom of speech and thought flows not from the beneficence of 
the state but from the inalienable rights of the person.”). 
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strict scrutiny review,88 the holding in Morse relies on the prin-
cipal’s sensibilities of student propriety.89 And she made a deci-
sion, not about some acting out at school, but an adolescent’s be-
havior on the public sidewalk. By requiring no empirical proof 
and taking the principal’s word as to both the sign’s meaning and 
the foreseeable possibility of discipline breaking down because 
of the pro-drug message, the majority treated student off-cam-
pus speech as a low value category, one that requires neither 
strict nor intermediate scrutiny. Although it did not overrule 
Tinker, Morse sharply curtailed the constitutional protection of 
student expression and enabled school officials to undercut stu-
dent engagement in the marketplace of ideas. Now, school offi-
cials only need to make a reasonable inference about the conse-
quences of student speech, without proving it to have been 
disruptive.90 Of even greater consequence, the Court counte-
nanced the school’s censorship of contrarian speech with an ar-
guably political message. 
Frederick expressed himself off school grounds and did not 
make his statement on a thoroughfare connected to school. He 
and other students sought to garner attention by gathering near 
school when journalists were present. The record contained no 
indication that Frederick’s conduct met the Tinker heightened 
scrutiny test for justifiable school restraint on student expres-
sion: he had not materially and substantially disrupted school-
work or school functions. In fact, the principal instigated the al-
tercation. Moreover, the Court should have distinguished Morse 
from Hazelwood because Frederick had not sought to publish the 
message on a school platform. Furthermore, he displayed the 
sign away from the official school event, albeit within ready view 
of school officials. The Morse majority relied on rational basis re-
view, as if student speech that could be interpreted to advocate 
illegal conduct were a category unprotected by First Amendment 
 
 88. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983) (“In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been de-
voted to assembly and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activity 
are sharply circumstantial.”). 
 89. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (asserting that 
rational basis review allows for “a legislative choice” that “is not subject to court-
room fact finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by ev-
idence or empirical data”). 
 90. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (“[W]e hold that schools may take steps to safe-
guard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded 
as encouraging illegal drug use.”). 
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norms, history, and tradition.91 This conclusion has had far-
reaching implications about students’ abilities to advocate 
against existing legal rules. 
II.  THE CATEGORICAL FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE AND 
MODERN SCHOOL DILEMMAS   
By increasingly deferring to school officials’ pedagogical 
judgments, the Court has created a de facto, albeit inchoate, cat-
egory of lower level speech that had not previously been defined 
in judicial or scholarly literature.92 The plasticity of the rational 
basis test threatens student political and self-expressive speech. 
The new direction in student speech has significantly shifted 
from the Tinker standard for the protection of students’ abilities 
to express controversial views on heated subjects. Even when a 
school suppressed speech because of its content—such as when 
the school newspaper sought to publish articles on subjects dis-
approved by the school principal or students used impropriety at 
school events—the Court refused to engage in heightened re-
view.93 Much student speech is now treated as low value com-
munication that is unprotected by the First Amendment. 
The Roberts Court has repeatedly asserted that regulations 
of certain categories of adult speech—including obscene and 
fraudulent speech—likewise raise no First Amendment con-
cerns. The latitude the Supreme Court showed school officials in 
Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse has created a similar low status 
for various forms of students’ expressions, asserted on and off 
campuses, and diminished the judicial role of protecting a core 
constitutional liberty. Lower court opinions that were rendered 
after Morse are a patchwork of ad hoc conclusions about the 
school officials’ latitude to suppress artistic and political state-
ments. Courts often treat student communications as if they 
 
 91. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 406 (1992) (relying on ra-
tional standard of review in the context of “categories of unprotected speech”); 
see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640–41 (1968) (providing an ex-
ample of a category of speech requiring only rational basis review). 
 92. CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW SCHOOLS AND 
COURTS SUBVERT STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 94 (2015) (recognizing 
the Supreme Court’s “taxonomy of censorship for student speech” and how the 
chosen category “determines the level of constitutional protection the speech 
receives”). 
 93. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (holding that 
content-based regulations must be reviewed on the basis of the strict scrutiny 
analysis). 
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were part of a low-value category along the lines asserted in Ste-
vens, Entertainment Merchants, and Alvarez.94 
Such treatment endangers free speech rights, especially 
when it results in deference to school officials who often seem 
prone to favor discipline over free speech. Some examples will 
help illustrate the point: A high senior, Jakob, in the Clear Fork 
High School in Ohio was suspended for retweeting a message in 
favor of an individual who was suing the district to decriminalize 
marijuana.95 The suspension was significant blow to Jakob’s life 
prospects.96 He had nearly a straight A grade point average and 
was the second highest scorer on his soccer team.97 Prior to the 
suspension he had been an attractive candidate to college re-
cruiters.98 The blot on Jakob’s transcript diminished his availa-
ble options for a college scholarship.99 In a different case, a high 
school in Staten Island, New York suspended a student for 
tweeting a photograph with an image of a teacher’s automobile 
parked next to a “No Parking” traffic sign and adding that he 
hoped the van would soon be towed.100 So too an eighth grader 
who wore a patriotic t-shirt in support of fallen soldiers was sus-
pended by a rigid rule against shirt designs with “violence re-
lated reference.”101 His shirt had images of boots, helmet, and 
gun, along with the words, “Standing for those who stood for us,” 
and was clearly a political statement.102 But the Supreme 
Court’s deference to educators’ decisions, in preference to 
Tinker ’s more rigorous protections of student speech, left even 
patriotic statements at the ad hoc discretion of teachers. At a 
high school, journalists were suspended for refusing to follow 
 
 94. See infra text accompanying notes 86–106. 
 95. Linda Martz, Senior Athlete Suspended for Weed-Related Retweet Sues 
District, MANSFIELD NEWS J. (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.mansfieldnewsjounal 
.com/story/news/2014/04/10/clear-fork-senior-suspended-for-weed-related 
-retweet-sues-district/7566503. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Daniel Leddy, Advance Legal Columnist: The Issue of Students’ Free-
Speech Rights is a Murky Area, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE (Feb. 26, 2013), http:// 
www.silive.com/opinion/danielleddy/index.ssf/2013/02/advance_legal_ 
columnist_the_is.html. 
 101. Eugene Volokh, Eighth-Grader Suspended for Not Removing Patriotic 
T-Shirt Depicting a Fallen Soldier ’s Rifle, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/ 
2015/10/12/eighth-grader-suspended-for-not-removing-patriotic-t-shirt 
-depicting-a-fallen-soldiers-rifle. 
 102. Id. 
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their principal’s mandate to use the Redskins team name be-
cause they regarded it to be offensive.103 Examples of this type 
could be multiplied, but these should suffice to illustrate the 
gravity of censorship associated with unbridled administrative 
restrictions of free speech rights at the high school and grade 
school levels. 
This Part of the Article demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court’s newly loosened approach to student speech is part of a 
broader categorical analysis that derides the balancing of inter-
ests. Lower courts increasingly review controversial student 
statements by the extent to which school censorship is analogous 
to one of the categories the Supreme Court has found to be of low 
value: vulgar, school-sponsored, or advocating illegality.104 This 
categorical doctrine has resulted in a chilling of students who 
wish to express themselves freely about matters of social, com-
munal, and personal importance. In Section A, I describe the for-
malistic doctrine that enumerates categories of unprotected 
speech but requires strict scrutiny analysis for other content re-
strictions. In Section B, I demonstrate that various lower courts 
have understood recent Supreme Court developments to relegate 
on and off-campus student speech to a low-value category, sub-
ject only to rational basis review. 
A. CATEGORICAL FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 
Outside the student speech cases, the Court has become 
more formalistic in its approach to free speech cases. In Stevens, 
Entertainment Merchants, and Alvarez, a majority of Justices de-
rided judicial balancing of free speech against other values. 
While the Justices have never asserted that student speech is 
outside the purview of the First Amendment—thus Tinker tech-
nically remains intact—the recent turn in favor of school admin-
istrators effectively (although not explicitly) treats student 
speech within a set of expressions that only receives the lowest 
level of adjudicative scrutiny. 
The Court first articulated the existence of low value speech 
in a seminal 1942 decision, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,105 
 
 103. When Educators Become Censors, Students Are Marginalized: Edito-
rial, NJ.COM (Oct. 12. 2014), http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/10/ 
when_teachers_become_censors_the_students_suffer_editorial.html. 
 104. See supra Part I. 
 105. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
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which upheld a state statute that criminalized the use of “offen-
sive, derisive, or annoying words” in public place.106 The major-
ity read the statute narrowly, under a newly created fighting 
words doctrine: the First Amendment does not prohibit govern-
ment from criminalizing speech whose very utterance inflicts in-
jury or tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace.107 
Fighting words are among a “class of speech” government can 
censure without running afoul of the First Amendment.108 The 
majority also defined other classes of speech, including “the lewd 
and obscene, the profane, [and] the libelous,” whose prevention 
and punishment did not raise First Amendment concerns.109 In 
Chaplinsky, the Court nowhere indicated that these categories 
are rigid, exhaustive, or historical. To the contrary, the majority 
explained that those types of expressions were outside the scope 
of the Free Speech Clause because their “utterances are no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight so-
cial value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality.”110 The Court, therefore, regarded social valua-
tions of some expressions to be legitimate because of its potential 
to generate disorders, such as immediate breaches of the peace. 
While the Court listed only a limited group of unprotected ex-
pressions, based on later jurisprudence, to this list should be 
added misleading and illegal advertisement,111 workplace sexual 
harassment,112 and conspiracy to commit crimes.113 
For decades, academics and courts regarded Chaplinsky to 
have established a balancing test, requiring judges to identify 
and weigh the relevant demands of free expression and of public 
regulation.114 History and precedent certainly played a role, but 
 
 106. Id. at 568. 
 107. Id. at 572. 
 108. Id. at 571–72. 
 109. Id. at 572. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976). 
 112. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 410 (1992) (White, J., concur-
ring). 
 113. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937). 
 114. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976) (citing Chap-
linsky to determine the appropriate way to identify “a more appropriate accom-
modation between the public’s interest in an uninhibited press and its equally 
compelling need for judicial redress of libelous utterances”); Iannarelli v. Mor-
ton, 327 F. Supp. 873, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (discussing Chaplinsky balancing); 
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judges identified unprotected categories of speech by their inclu-
sion or exclusion from core free speech values of self-expression, 
political participation, or informative content. 
More recent decisions of the Roberts Court have used for-
malistic and categorical language. Rather than following the 
Chaplinsky balancing formula, in 2009, with United States v. 
Stevens,115 the Court began relying on a presumption of calcified 
categories, whose existence it supposed to be fixed at the year 
the Bill of Rights were ratified.116 Chief Justice Roberts, who 
wrote the majority opinion in Stevens, explained away the Chap-
linsky recognition of balancing in First Amendment cases, as a 
“descriptive statement” about rigid categories.117 This perspec-
tive discounts the use of rigorous balancing criteria for rendering 
judgment.118 As I have shown elsewhere, it also overlooks judi-
cial creation of low value speech categories—such as child por-
nography, obscenity, and fighting words—in twentieth century 
decisions rather than in 1791.119 
 
Marc Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibi-
tions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107, 127 n.90 (1963) (relying on 
Chaplinsky style balancing); Henry H. Foster, Jr., The Relation and Correlation 
of Freedom and Security, 58 W. VA. L. REV. 325, 349 n.73 (1956) (listing Chap-
linsky among cases deploying balancing analysis); Nadine Strossen, United 
States v. Stevens: Restricting Two Major Rationales for Content-Based Speech 
Restrictions, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67, 81 (arguing that the last sentence of 
Chaplinsky invites judges to engage in open-ended balancing). 
 115. 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 116. This originalist conception appeared in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
in R.A.V.: 
From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like other free but civ-
ilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech 
in a few limited areas, which are “of such slight social value as a step 
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality.” We have recog-
nized that “the freedom of speech” referred to by the First Amendment 
does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations. 
505 U.S. at 382–83 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1942)). 
 117. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471 (2010). 
 118. I’ve developed a rigorous balancing test consisting of: (1) whether the 
expression at issue is likely to implicate specific constitutional, statutory, or 
common law harms; (2) whether the restriction on speech is based on a histori-
cal or traditional doctrine; (3) whether any government policies benefitting the 
general welfare weigh in favor of the regulation; (4) whether the regulation on 
speech closely fits the public ends that is sought; and (5) whether there are any 
less restrictive alternatives to achieving them. Alexander Tsesis, Multifactoral 
Free Speech, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1017, 1036 (2016). 
 119. See generally Tsesis, supra note 8 (explaining the ways in which low 
value speech categories are overlooked). 
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In Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, 
held the Animal Crush Videos Act to be facially unconstitu-
tional.120 The statute had criminalized the creation, distribution, 
or possession of crush videos depicting actual suffocation, drown-
ing, and infliction of injuries on non-human animals.121 The case 
specifically addressed the federal limitation on visual depictions 
and distributions of videos containing images of the brutal 
crushing of animals, conduct which all fifty states punish 
through anti-cruelty statutes.122 Ultimately, the Court deter-
mined the statute was substantially overbroad, censoring even 
protected expressions, such as hunting videos.123 More im-
portantly for our discussion on the current status of school 
speech, the Court assayed against “ad hoc balancing of relative 
social costs and benefits,” determined to prevent judges from us-
ing a “free-floating test for First Amendment coverage.”124 The 
Stevens Court held fast to a concern that weighing analysis was 
“highly manipulable.”125 The only regulations the Court found 
the First Amendment allowed are those that target historically 
and traditionally recognized forms of low level speech such as 
obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to 
a crime.126 According to the Court’s line of reasoning, violent 
video depictions were not among any historical or traditional cat-
egories of low value speech, and therefore the prohibition against 
their depiction was a content based intrusion on expression. As 
I will demonstrate in Section B of this Part, the very manipula-
bility the Court initiated in the crush video case is the one that 
it, inconsistently, imbedded in the student speech cases. 
Following up, the year after the Stevens decision, Justice 
Scalia further entrenched the categorical reasoning in his opin-
ion to Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, which 
struck a state law that restricted the sale and rental of violent 
video games to minors.127 As in Stevens, the majority refused to 
defer to public officials’ assessments of speech unworthy of con-
stitutional protection. The Court made clear that “without per-
 
 120. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 497 (2010). 
 121. Id. at 497 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006)). 
 122. H. R. REP. No. 106-397, at 2–4 (1999). 
 123. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 486. 
 124. Id. at 461, 470. 
 125. Id. at 472. 
 126. Id. at 468. 
 127. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
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suasive evidence” that some new restriction on expressive con-
tent “is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of 
proscription,” lawmakers cannot alter First Amendment doc-
trine on the basis of balancing assessments about the social costs 
and benefits of controversial expressions.128 Scalia was not re-
miss to assert that even the judiciary must not multiply the lim-
ited number of low-value speech categories such as obscenity, in-
citement, fraud, defamation, speech linked to criminal activity, 
and fighting words.129 This list, he claimed constituted a “well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention 
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”130 
The Supreme Court confirmed its commitment to the bright-
line, categorical approach in United States v. Alvarez, where it 
found the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 to be unconstitutional.131 The 
decision overturned the conviction of Xavier Alvarez, who had 
lied about having been awarded the Congressional Medal of 
Honor.132 In his plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy condemned 
the use of any “free-floating test” of “ad hoc balancing of relative 
social costs and benefits” and characterized it as “startling and 
dangerous.”133 In the school speech area, several scholars have 
questioned the merits of the Stevens categorical approach and its 
rigidity in follow-up cases like Alvarez,134 but, even leaving aside 
 
 128. Id. at 792. 
 129. Id. at 790–91. 
 130. Id. at 791(citing Chaplisky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 
(1942). 
 131. 132 S. Ct. at 2551 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 132. Id. at 2542. 
 133. Id. at 2544 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)). 
 134. See Tsesis, supra note 8, at 506–14 (demonstrating that the Court’s cat-
egorical approach deviates from the balancing intrinsic to foundational obscen-
ity, fraud, and defamation precedents); see also William D. Araiza, Citizens 
United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law Project: First Amendment Rules and 
Standards in Three Acts, 40 STETSON L. REV. 821, 836–37 (2011) (recognizing 
that rigid rules do have some value for interpretation because “they provide 
enough of a thumb on the judicial scale to produce predictable results that do a 
reasonably good job of protecting the constitutional value at issue,” but caution-
ing that some judges might invoke rigid rules “to hide behind that standard 
when striking down speech restrictions that may be justified by their unique 
factual or social context”); Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in 
First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 388 (2009) (draw-
ing attention to a variety of low-value categories that reflect a balancing of val-
ues); David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection 
of Self-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 85–86 (2012) (discussing why the 
historically linked approach is “fundamentally illusory” and contrary to balanc-
ing methodologies the Court relied on to find obscenity and fighting words were 
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that controversy, the leeway Morse, Fraser, and Hazelwood 
granted administrators to decide what is substantially disrup-
tive allows for “startling and dangerous” administrative deci-
sions to be made to suppress speech because of its message.135 
Student speech is conspicuously missing from the lists of 
low-value speech proffered in Stevens, Entertainment Merchants 
Association, and Alvarez. Indeed, the Court’s reliance on strict 
scrutiny in Entertainment Merchants Association to vindicate 
adolescents’ ability to partake in expressive conduct confirms 
that, outside of schools, the First Amendment protects youths’ 
First Amendment rights.136 Communication within schools has 
never explicitly been found to be a low-value speech; indeed 
Tinker signaled that student speech should be taken seriously 
and constitutionally protected for its valuable contribution to po-
litical discourse and the marketplace of ideas. But the erosion of 
the test for substantial disruption—which after Morse has effec-
tively deferred to school officials’ decisions to suppress an ad hoc 
list of student communications,137 even about matters of political 
and social importance—has de facto treated student communi-
cations as a new category of low-value speech. This is a curious 
result because fundamental rights are not lost at school, rather 
extra disciplinary authority reflects the need to prevent disrup-
tion of education, not a justification for viewpoint suppression 
about matters even as controversial as drug use or school admin-
istration. The Court’s formalistic methodology leaves little room 
for nuanced judicial weighing of factors such as student age, ed-
ucational values, and pedagogical concerns. Instead, the Court 
has been lax in its review of student speech cases. As a result, 
administrators now enjoy extensive latitude to discipline stu-
dents for even core political speech. 
 
outside of First Amendment protection); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional 
Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 
1652 (2005) (“In a striking number of cases the Court has forgotten the reasons 
behind particular rules and has come to treat them as nothing more than state-
ments of constitutional requirements. This . . . distorts the relationship the 
Court has to other governmental actors and to the American people.”). 
 135. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2554. 
 136. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–801 (2011) (re-
quiring government to prove up a restriction on children’s speech using the 
strict scrutiny standard). 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 101–03. 
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B. MORSE’S IMPACT ON STUDENT SPEECH 
Recent lower court decisions have grappled with the analyt-
ical divide between Morse and Tinker. Several of them have 
adopted a categorical rejection of free speech claims in favor of 
administrative efficiency. For half a century, there has been a 
consensus that public school students enjoy First Amendment 
protections. Insofar as student speech is political and not mate-
rially disruptive or substantially disorderly, one would antici-
pate rigorous judicial scrutiny of school districts’ restrictions on 
student expression. Morse, Fraser, and Hazelwood eroded the 
safeguards of Tinker, categorically rejecting student speech 
claims rather than balancing them against school governance 
thereby allowing school officials to rely on an ad hoc sense of con-
tent-based propriety to censor students. The determination of 
whether student speech is about a public matter, lewd, embar-
rassing to other students and their parents, or supportive of 
crime is now largely left to superintendents, principals, and 
teachers. Judicial deference to their judgments has relegated 
many types of valuable student conversations to the same ra-
tional basis level of scrutiny as those 2 categories listed in Ste-
vens, Entertainment Merchants, and Alvarez as outside the First 
Amendment ambit. 
In choosing to defer to school administrators, as in Morse, 
rather than engage in heightened scrutiny analysis, as in Tinker, 
courts have created a de facto low-value speech category that im-
pacts student communications both inside and outside schools. 
Following Morse and treating student speech as low value cre-
ates problems, specifically because it provides significant disci-
plinary latitude to punish children for offensive communica-
tions; expands the disciplinary reach of schools; and allows for 
increased administrative censorship. This provides the signifi-
cant disciplinary latitude to punish children for offensive com-
munications. Yet, the Court has recognized the inherent ambi-
guity of using a patently offensive standard, since many people 
take offense at political statements and social commentary.138 
The First Amendment is implicated by granting administrators 
 
 138. See Frederick v. Morse, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007) (“Petitioners urge us 
to adopt the broader rule that Frederick’s speech is proscribable because it is 
plainly ‘offensive’ as that term is used in Fraser. We think this stretches Fraser 
too far; that case should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit 
under some definition of ‘offensive.’ After all, much political and religious speech 
might be perceived as offensive to some.”). 
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nearly unlimited ad hoc discretion about what constitutes a rea-
sonable disciplinary measure, and in its most recent cases the 
Court has allowed for a loosely defined pedagogical concern to 
trump student free expression. Contextual adjudication, not cat-
egorical deference to school authorities, is necessary in this area 
because student dialogue on controversial issues is so important 
to children’s civic and personal improvements. Without more 
stringent protections, students are chilled from openly discuss-
ing matters such as abortion, divorce, and illegal drugs. This ef-
fectively stymies student voices, and it is likely to suppress stu-
dent engagement, development, and deliberation. 
The Morse majority’s reliance on speculative rational basis 
review has created a de facto low-value speech category that im-
pacts student communications both inside and outside schools. 
Morse bolstered the interpretive status of appellate cases that 
upheld disciplinary measures rendered against students who 
made offensive statements off campus.139 Prior to Morse, speech 
outside school, even lewd gestures directed at a teacher, had 
been deemed constitutionally protected and beyond the control 
of school disciplinarians.140 For instance, when materials inad-
vertently appeared on campus—in one case because the writer’s 
younger brother took to school a composition depicting a violent 
siege—a court found any school inconvenience to educational 
discipline was outweighed by the values of free speech.141 This 
form of balancing has now given way in many jurisdictions to 
categorical rejection of student claims. 
 
 139. Prior to Morse there was a judicial uncertainty about how to review 
cases of student speech occurring off campus but subsequently brought into the 
school. See Sullivan v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1075–77 (5th Cir. 
1973) (holding that school authorities could censure the sale within and near 
school of an underground student newspaper, not sanctioned by the school, con-
taining an expletive against education); Sullivan v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 307 
F. Supp. 1328, 1333–35 (S.D. Tex. 1969) supplemented, 333 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. 
Tex. 1971) vacated, 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973) (additional facts). 
 140. See, e.g., Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441–42 (D. Me. 1986) (find-
ing student could not be disciplined for lewd gesture made outside school); 
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo.1998) 
(holding that student was likely to succeed on a First Amendment claim for ma-
terial derogatory statements about school administration that were posted on 
student’s personal Internet page). 
 141. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 
2004) (“Given the unique facts of the present case, we decline to find that 
Adam’s drawing constitutes student speech on the school premises. Adam’s 
drawing was completed in his home, stored for two years, and never intended 
by him to be brought to campus.”). 
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The holding in Morse, in favor of the school principal’s deci-
sion to suspend a student for his presumed viewpoint about ma-
rijuana, signaled an increased tolerance for administrative cen-
sorship. By upholding the principal’s decision to suspend, the 
majority in effect indicated lower courts had been mistaken that 
Tinker prohibited viewpoint discrimination.142 Morse, in fact, ap-
pears to have modified the standard from Tinker, offering 
schools greater powers to control student messages with negligi-
ble judicial oversight. 
Furthermore, Tinker required judges to carefully evaluate 
the contextual circumstances to determine whether students 
were engaged in the fundamental right of self-expression and 
then balancing it against the reasonable need for the school to 
maintain order.143 This flexible model for judicial analysis differs 
from the categorical requirements of the Stevens line of cases.144 
Tinker held that:  
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibi-
tion of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that 
its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid 
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpop-
ular viewpoint.145 
 Whereas in Morse, the Court allowed a principal to treat an un-
popular message as if it were outside the ambit of the First 
Amendment, without any show of disruption. Some lower courts 
have likewise relied on administrative decision makers, without 
subjecting disciplinary decisions to careful scrutiny. 
In this Section, I trace some of the most impactful recent 
developments in the school speech context, which have degraded 
political, social, and artistic student speech below the level of 
constitutionally protected expression. In some cases, courts have 
given lip-service to the Tinker formula while countenancing pun-
ishments for expressing views on school grounds or off of them, 
making it seem that Tinker ’s most famous principle, that stu-
dents do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the school house door,”146 has been much 
 
 142. For a prior case arguing that Tinker applied to viewpoint discrimina-
tion, see Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 430 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 143. I based this statement from a variety of pre-Morse cases asserting that 
Tinker requires judges to engage in totality of the circumstances analyses. See 
Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 768 (9th Cir. 2006); LaVine v. 
Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001); Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 
171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 144. See supra text accompanying notes 123–34. 
 145. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).  
 146. Id. at 506. 
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eroded by later jurisprudence, especially Morse. The effect has 
been to qualify student speech protections to a point analogous 
to the low value categories listed in the Stevens line of cases.147 
1. On-campus Speech 
In a case illustrative of the increasingly deferential judicial 
track, Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District,148 a cir-
cuit court upheld school administrators’ decision to repress po-
litical student speech. The principal and assistant principal of a 
Northern California high school had ordered the student body 
not to wear U.S. flags in a prominent place during a Cinco de 
Mayo celebration. Dianna Dariano was among a small group of 
students who arrived in school on that festive date wearing im-
ages of the flag.149 Worried a racial skirmish might ensue, the 
principal and assistant principal directed them to either turn 
their shirts inside out or to leave school with an excused ab-
sence.150 Dariano’s mom pulled her from school, but two other 
students chose to cover the flag and return to class.151 In addi-
tion, students with less prominently displayed flag logos on their 
clothes were also allowed to return to class.152 
At trial, administrators explained that they had acted to 
quell the student protest for fear that their demonstrative dis-
play of the U.S. flag at a celebration of Mexican history could 
incited violence.153 Their assessment of the circumstances was 
based on the school’s history of ethnic violence. During the pre-
vious six years, thirty racial fights between Hispanic and Cau-
casian students had occurred at the high school.154 However, on 
the day of Dariano’s flag protest no physical altercations took 
place; indeed, she had only been subject to mild verbal taunting 
about her patriotic display.155 
There was no reason for the court to treat the flag display as 
a low-value form of speech. To the contrary, Dariano’s display 
was clearly meant to be a political statement, similar to the black 
armband used by students in Tinker. Nothing in the record 
 
 147. See supra text accompanying notes 105–07, 119–40. 
 148. Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 149. Id. at 764. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1039 
(N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Dariano, 767 F 3d. at 778. 
 154. Id. at 774. 
 155. Id. 
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demonstrated the administration’s claim that wearing a flag was 
immediately likely to trigger a fight.156 Neither did anyone 
threaten Dariano with any menacing word of gestures.157 She 
was merely subject to razzing, so ordinary at high schools. Even 
though her wearing a flag decal fit into no historically and tradi-
tionally accepted category of unprotected speech, the school ad-
ministration acted to suppress her message. And the Ninth Cir-
cuit countenanced this censorship without requiring the school 
to present proof of substantial educational disruption. Adminis-
trators exploited the ambiguity of recent school speech cases, 
treating the matter as only requiring rational basis review.158 
Dariano was a glaring departure from Tinker analysis; in-
deed, it was closely aligned to the categorical dismissal of stu-
dent speech as being of low value and not warranting stringent 
First Amendment protections. The trial court deferred to school 
officials’ decision to suppress the American flag in order to pre-
vent an as-yet unplanned and unformulated disruption.159 Ra-
ther than protecting the messenger, officials favored those who 
wished her message to be silenced. The court gave greater 
weight to the demands of the silencer than the expression of Dar-
iano. This was a diametrical opposite approach to the one an-
nounced in Tinker, but much in line with Morse. In Tinker, the 
Supreme Court had found insufficient the school’s claim that it 
had the discretion to deny students the right to express their po-
litical points of view because “[o]utside the classrooms, a few stu-
dents made hostile remarks to the children wearing armbands, 
but there were no threats or acts of violence on school prem-
ises.”160 In Dariano, to the contrary, the circuit court believed 
the negative remarks made to students wearing the flag decal—
 
 156. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 408 (1992) (White, J., concurring) 
(asserting that the fighting words doctrine concerns “a class of speech that con-
veys an overriding message of personal injury and imminent violence”). 
 157. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2027 (2015) (relying on a 
scienter framework to analyze a federal statute prohibiting threats from being 
conveyed through interstate communications media). 
 158. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct 2218, 2231 (2015). 
 159. See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 779 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (“Here, both the specific events . . . and the pattern of which those 
events were a part made it reasonable for school officials to proceed as though 
the threat of a potentially violent disturbance was real”); Dariano v. Unified 
Sch. Dist., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1045 (2011) (“[T]he Court finds that based on 
these undisputed facts, the school officials reasonably forecast that Plaintiffs’ 
clothing could cause a substantial disruption with school activities.”). 
 160. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
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“Why are you wearing that? Do you not like Mexicans?”161—pro-
vided the school with reason to reasonably believe violence might 
ensue and therefore to halt the messengers from traversing the 
facilities.162 School officials could have understood those two 
questions as starting points for moderated dialogue between the 
opposing factions of students. Without any disruption at school, 
the principal and assistant principal lacked objective indicia for 
shutting down the messengers. 
Relying on other students’ warnings (such as, a comment to 
the assistant principal that, “You may want to go out to the quad 
area. There might be some—there might be some issues”)163 and 
a past history of fights, officials impeded Dariano and her group 
from displaying their political message during the school’s cele-
bration of Cinco de Mayo. The court engaged in no more than 
rational basis review, despite the strict scrutiny protections po-
litical speech ordinarily receives. In a school environment, the 
Tinker standard would have been appropriate for deciding the 
conflict because the message was political and deliberative;164 
instead, the court adopted the lowest level of scrutiny, allowing 
for administrator speculation to gainsay student self-expression. 
In effect, the court empowered school officials to act on a “heck-
ler’s veto.”165 Rather than treating the flag t-shirt as a symbol 
protected under the First Amendment, the court used only min-
imum judicial oversight and, thereby, allowed school staff to de-
fine a low-value category and to rely on it to the student 
speaker’s detriment. Rather than exactingly scrutinizing the 
constitutionality of suppressing a political message, the circuit 
court enabled school administrators to act on a category of pat-
riotic symbols they believed might lead to violence. That is too 
plastic and inchoate a standard to safeguard the high constitu-
tional stakes of the case. 
In a separate district court case from a different appellate 
circuit than Dariano, the judge likewise treated commentary on 
a public issue as if it were low-level speech along the Fraser, Ha-
zelwood, and Morse line of cases, rather than invoking the robust 
protections of Tinker. J.A. v. Fort Wayne Community School 
 
 161. See, e.g., Dariano, 767 F.3d at 767. 
 162. Id. at 777. 
 163. Id. at 767. 
 164. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989) (“The very purpose of a na-
tional flag is to serve as a symbol of our country.”). 
 165. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) (rejecting 
the use of a heckler ’s veto to censor expression). 
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arose when school officials prohibited a high school student, J.A., 
from wearing a bracelet with the inscription, “I <3 boobies. (Keep 
a Breast).”166 J.A.’s communicative conduct violated the school 
rule barring that specific message from being worn in school.167 
School administrators instituted the policy because they deemed 
the terminology to be “offensive to women and inappropriate for 
school wear,” having previously received a complaint about a sin-
gle male student wearing the bracelet and harassing a female 
student.168 J.A. explained to officials that her mother, who was 
a breast cancer survivor, gave her the bracelet, and that she 
wore it at school to raise awareness about the disease.169 The 
school’s censorship was not limited to substantially disruptive 
speech, which would have been a legitimate exercise of school 
authority under Tinker, but stifled J.A.’s social advocacy based 
on an overbroadly defined category of vulgarity. The slogan orig-
inated with the creator of the bracelet, Keep a Breast Founda-
tion.170 
In upholding the school policy, the court gave inadequate 
consideration to Tinker, citing it only in passing, for the pro 
forma principle that students retain free speech rights.171 The 
bulk of the opinion defers to school authority, even though at is-
sue was explicit content and viewpoint discrimination.172 
Thereby, the court treated a statement raising awareness about 
a serious health matter as if it was a form of low-value speech, 
such as might have been listed by the Court in Stevens, enjoying 
no First Amendment protection, and treated under the rational 
basis standard.173 Rather than giving any substantial weight to 
the student’s argument and rigorously examining her legal 
claims, the court relied on Fraser ’s recognition that administra-
tors can prohibit vulgar and lewd expressions.174 The district 
court judge ignored the clear difference between the “explicit sex-
 
 166. No. 1:12-CV-155JVB, 2013 WL 4479229, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 20, 2013). 
 167. Id. at *1 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at *2. 
 172. See id. at *2–7. 
 173. Id. at *3 (“Giving appropriate deference to schools requires courts to 
review school determinations by asking whether an objective observer could 
reasonably interpret the slogan as lewd, vulgar, obscene, or plainly offensive.”). 
 174. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986). 
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ual metaphor” used by the student at a school sponsored assem-
bly in Fraser,175 and the clearly health-related message in the 
case before it.176 
The court openly discounted the First Amendment value of 
J.A.’s speech. It acknowledged that the bracelet contained “com-
mentary [about] social or political issues,”177 which might have 
been expected to elicit some form of heightened scrutiny. In ad-
dition, the court entirely discounted a critical factor of the Tinker 
test by deeming it irrelevant that the school conceded the brace-
let caused no substantial disruption.178 Nevertheless, the court 
illogically treated the matter as if it involved communication un-
worthy of constitutional protection, as if a statement about 
women’s healthcare were similar to obscenity. School officials 
were only required to demonstrate that based on their profes-
sional assessment of the student’s “age, maturity, and other 
characteristics” they were better able to decide whether to sup-
press ideas than judges.179 That standard is unobjective, prone 
to school officials’ subjective error, and chilling of student 
speech. Deference to school administrators even led the judge to 
adopt a very questionable school characterization of a phrase as 
lewd that the student wore to raise cancer awareness, even 
though it was clearly linked to treatment of a life-threatening 
disease.180 With First Amendment rights at stake, the district 
court’s approach shifted the duty to interpret the Constitution 
from the judiciary to school administrators. 
The Supreme Court’s weakening of student speech in cases 
like Fraser and Morse to a lower value speech category, which 
can be abridged, even absent any clear proof of substantial dis-
ruption or interference with education, has led to inconsistent 
holdings. In B.H. v. Easton Area School District, the Third Cir-
cuit addressed the constitutionality of suppressing the identical 
message, “I <3 boobies! (KEEP A BREAST),” as the one found to 
be unprotected speech in J.A.181 In B.H., middle school girls wore 
bracelets with that message at school.182 The Third Circuit held 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. J.A., 2013 WL 4479229, at *1. 
 177. Id. at *5. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at *7. 
 180. See id. at *1, *7. 
 181. B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 297–98 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 182. Id. at 298–99. 
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that the message was not plainly lewd.183 The en banc court rec-
ognized that the danger of school officials acting capriciously by 
simply invoking “a parade of horribles” would allow school offi-
cials to suppress political and social comments on the basis of 
protecting students against “ambiguously lewd speech.”184 Rely-
ing on the officials’ slippery slope argument, “schools could elim-
inate all student speech touching on sex or merely having the 
potential to offend.”185 The bracelet did not even contain a swear 
word.186 Unlike the J.A. court, the Third Circuit carefully parsed 
Tinker in light of later Supreme Court holdings for the proposi-
tion that administrators can limit student speech to prevent dis-
ruption from lewd or profane speech, illegal drug use advocacy, 
or disruption of pedagogy.187 The school did not provide evidence 
warranting deference for any of those three concerns.188 
2. Off-Campus Speech 
Several courts have also treated social commentary stu-
dents made off campus as unprotected and subject to the disci-
plinary authority of school officials. Some lower courts have in-
terpreted Morse to grant school administrators great latitude for 
sanctioning categories of communications outside the confines of 
school. Even if we were to accept the holding in Morse, rejecting 
the criticism I leveled against it earlier in this article,189 the case 
should be limited to school-sponsored activities, not extended to 
speech made outside and then accessed inside educational insti-
tutions.190 
Before the digital age, the demarcation between home and 
school were self-evident. The Internet has enabled students to 
create messages at home and to direct them to the entire student 
body. With the expansion of the Internet’s domain into high 
schools and grade schools, courts have grappled with how to 
characterize postings made at the students’ homes or elsewhere 
 
 183. Id. at 320. 
 184. Id. at 317. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 297–98. For a list of so-called infamous “filthy words,” see FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978). 
 187. Id. at 304 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 
(1986); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)). 
 188. See id. at 303–07. 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 77–91. 
 190. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 (“Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a 
public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.”). 
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outside the school property and only later streamed on-campus. 
The digital complexity of determining whether the complaint 
arises on campus or off is evident from a Second Circuit case, 
Doninger v. Niehoff, involving the alleged violation by high 
school administrators of a student’s First Amendment rights.191 
Avery Doninger and several of her fellow students posted an 
initial e-mail from the high school’s computer lab, voicing dis-
gruntlement about an administrative decision to delay an up-
coming school concert, called Jamfest.192 The school principal 
then asked Doninger to retract a mistake in the text of that mes-
sage; instead, Doninger posted an anti-administration blogpost 
from home.193 The post appeared on an independent, private 
website, calling for student activism to convince the school prin-
cipal and superintendent to host the event without excessive de-
lay.194 
The court found the post to be vulgar, even though the only 
statements approaching vulgarity were the student’s provoca-
tively telling readers “to piss [the principal] off more” and calling 
persons at the central office a lewd appellation, “douchebags.”195 
Although the offending statements were uploaded from a private 
computer, as part of a call for collective action on a matter im-
pacting students’ lives, the court deferred to administrators’ 
judgments—as if the statements were of low value rather than 
as calls for social and political activism.196 The district court had 
found that punishing the student for speech made off campus 
would have a chilling effect on her future e-mail and blog com-
munications.197 That finding did not, however, lead the court to 
use heightened scrutiny, despite the school’s obvious censure of 
content.198 
 
 191. 527 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 192. Id. at 44. 
 193. Id. at 45. 
 194. Id.; Brief of Amicus Curiae, ACLU of Connecticut, in Support of Plain-
tiff ’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction at 1, 
Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007) (No. 3:07-cv-1129 
(MRK)) (stating that the student created the blog post from home). 
 195. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45–46. 
 196. See id. at 53. 
 197. Id. at 47. 
 198. See id. at 47–53. 
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The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s refusal to 
issue an injunction against the school, finding Doninger was un-
likely to prevail in her First Amendment complaint.199 The hold-
ing sanctioned the administrators’ punishment of a student who 
had passionately expressed opposition about the timing of a 
school event. The court of appeals empowered the school to pre-
vent her from expressing a contrarian viewpoint on a matter af-
fecting a large segment of the student population. 
While the Second Circuit couched its holding in Tinker ’s 
recognition of school officials’ need to prevent substantial disrup-
tions of school discipline,200 the holding countenanced a chilling 
of student speech on an important community matter. The lewd 
label blinded the court to any deep analysis of the context in 
which the blog posts were made, the location of the electronic 
transactions, the school politics involved, and other nuanced top-
ics that should have played a role in the decision. The court ruled 
that school officials could silence speech posted on an off-campus 
computer, when officials could reasonably foresee the message 
reaching school and being likely to create a disruption.201 The 
foreseeability approach countenances school officials’ specula-
tive assessment of risks posed by speech made outside the insti-
tution, indicating that the court has now undervalued the mes-
sage’s significance to core First Amendment interests: personal 
activism, political empowerment, and information dissemina-
tion. 
In fact, the court of appeals in Doninger could identify little 
disruption of school work, much less any substantial disruption, 
other than a couple of students commenting on the blog posting 
and a “deluge of calls and emails” to the school superintendent 
and principal, who admonished offending students during the 
morning class period.202 The court’s rationale upholds the sup-
pression of controversial ideas for an administratively created 
disruption in student classes. The circuit court found it sufficient 
that officials perceived Doninger’s communications to be “poten-
tially disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing controversy.”203 
 
 199. Id. at 53. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 48. 
 202. Id. at 50–51. 
 203. Id.  
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The court found it consequential that the student’s state-
ments were “at best misleading and at wors[t] false.”204 This jus-
tification for stifling speech run counter to the Supreme Court’s 
finding that in matters involving public controversies, public of-
ficials, and public speakers, the Constitution protects the value 
of even false statements that are not asserted maliciously or in 
reckless disregard for the truth.205 While analysis in the school 
setting differs, where a student makes controversial, and some-
times misleading, statements outside school that by themselves 
do not harm education, it is convincing to believe that “[e]ven a 
false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution 
to public debate, since it brings about ‘the clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with er-
ror.’”206 
While the student used wording inappropriate for the class-
room, on balance the utterance in question was part of a broader 
communication that was relevant to the student body, occurred 
off campus, and constituted social activism. Her speech should 
not have been treated like a low value category; instead, it 
should have received heightened judicial scrutiny. Doninger par-
ticipated with other students in collective expression in an effort 
to organize nonviolent protest opposing the decision of school ad-
ministrators, which was an exercise of free speech. 
In another case recognizing the right of schools to punish 
out-of-school speech, the Fourth Circuit reviewed a high school 
student’s suspension for posting a message under the heading, 
“S.A.S.H.,” which stood for “Students Against Sluts Herpes.”207 
The target of that acronym was a fellow student, Shay N.208 The 
poster, Kara Kowalski, invited 100 people to view and partici-
pate in group posts deriding Shay. School administrators subse-
quently suspended Kowalski for ten days and prevented her 
from being crowned to the elected office of Queen of Charm. De-
spite the expressive event having occurred off campus and not 
 
 204. Id. at 51. 
 205. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (“The 
constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a pub-
lic official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his 
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual mal-
ice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”). 
 206. Id. at 279 n.19, (quoting J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (R. B. McCallum ed., 
1946)). 
 207. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 208. Id. 
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having disrupted schoolwork, the court found the punishment 
did not violate Tinker ’s First Amendment immunities.209 The 
circuit court seems to have authorized school authorities in the 
Fourth Circuit to suspend students for comments made about 
their colleagues almost anywhere and anytime. 
A separate case from the Third Circuit also dealt with stu-
dent comments made off campus, J.S. v. Blue Mountain School 
District, also considered whether school officials could take ad-
verse action based on reasonable anticipation of substantial ed-
ucational disruption.210 However, the outcome was very different 
than the laxer treatment of free speech in the Second and Fourth 
Circuits. In J.S., one weekend two students used the personal 
computer of a parent to create a fallacious MySpace account, 
purporting the webpage to have been made by the middle school 
principal.211 The profile contained “nonsense and juvenile hu-
mor” with sexual vulgarity and profanity, including claims that 
the principal engaged in child abuse and bestiality.212 At first 
the profile was public, but the day after creating it J.S. made 
access to it private to twenty-two friends.213 As a consequence, 
the principal suspended J.S. from school for ten days. 
The principal certainly could have brought a common law 
defamation suit, but was school action constitutionally permissi-
ble? The school district proffered evidence demonstrating that 
students discussed the profile at school, creating a minor dis-
turbance in the math class that involved six or seven students 
speaking about the profile in the middle of a lesson.214 The Third 
Circuit found the school had failed to meet its evidentiary bur-
den of showing that these “rumblings” rose to a predictable and 
substantial disruption standard articulated in Tinker.215 That 
landmark case had received only perfunctory treatment in Don-
inger and Kowalski. The Third Circuit carefully compared the 
facts in Tinker to those in the record on appeal. The Tinker Court 
found the students’ use of the armband to be protected form of 
speech despite the predictably upsetting nature of the opposition 
to the Vietnam War.216 Comparatively, J.S.’s crass profile did not 
 
 209. Id. at 572. 
 210. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 928 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 211. Id. at 920. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 921. 
 214. Id. at 923. 
 215. Id. at 928–29. 
 216. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 560 (1969). 
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even name the principal, nor the location of his school.217 Hence, 
the Third Circuit determined that the Tinker precedent did not 
justify the suspension in this case.218 
III.  STUDENTS AS CITIZENS AND PEOPLE   
Lower court decisions evince the jurisprudential uncer-
tainty that is the byproduct of Fraser ’s, Morse’s, and Hazel-
wood’s departure from the rigorous protection of student free 
speech articulated by the Supreme Court in Tinker. Resolution 
of the recent circuit splits discussed in Part II requires the theo-
retical guidance of a contextual framework for evaluating school 
regulations that impose a substantial burden on student com-
munications. Judges should probe issues such as (1) whether 
school officials restricted students’ expressions because of the 
content or viewpoint of the message; (2) whether the censorship 
stifled speech that has been historically regarded within or ex-
trinsic to free speech values of citizens, including young citizens; 
(3) whether the student speech advanced deliberation, educa-
tion, debate, acculturation, and so on; (4) whether the policy and 
punishment—be it suspension, expulsion, or a trip to the princi-
pal’s office—was narrowly tailored to the stated purpose; and (5) 
whether any less onerous limitations were available without sti-
fling communications. Unlike the categorical approach, balanc-
ing parties’ interests allows for a contextual evaluation for the 
nuanced resolution of conflicts between students’ right to expres-
sion and administrators’ obligation to maintain discipline. 
This part of the Article proffers a tiered approach. Speech 
interests are not all identical. Contrary to the premises of the 
absolutist approach, not all content restrictions are as averse to 
First Amendment values as others. Political speech is at the core 
of the First Amendment219 but incitement is not even protected 
by the Constitution.220 When student speech is about politics, 
personal development, or the expansion of knowledge, judges 
should apply a strict scrutiny analysis, unless it disrupts educa-
tional programs. In circumstances where limitations on stu-
dents’ expression are created to advance certain neutral time, 
place, and manner concerns, the intermediate scrutiny standard 
 
 217. J.S., 650 F.3d at 920. 
 218. Id. at 929–30. 
 219. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (asserting that “lawful po-
litical speech” is “at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to pro-
tect”). 
 220. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002). 
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is appropriate. Finally, courts faced with cases involving speech 
with a low First Amendment threshold of importance—such as 
defamation, true threats, and fallacy—should defer to school of-
ficials’ expertise, unless they are enforced for arbitrary reasons. 
School interests are at their apogee when administrators 
seek to punish communications outside the purview of the First 
Amendment, such as incitement, copyright violations, or defa-
mations, and student interests are at their highest when they 
want to exercise core First Amendment values, such as politick-
ing, artistry, or informativeness. Contextual analysis is critical 
to proportional analysis, requiring judges to weigh competing in-
terests. Courts should be most deferential to students when they 
seek to achieve core constitutional rights. 
In some circumstances, school authority extends beyond the 
categories announced in the Stevens line of cases. The balancing 
approach recognizes that cases giving rise to more than one con-
stitutional concern require proportionate scrutiny of all perti-
nent law, not an automatic presumption in favor of free speech. 
Part III.C illustrates this point by balancing interests of stu-
dents wanting to display Confederate symbols while at school 
against officials’ authority to fulfill the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
obligation to prevent displays of the badges of slavery and invol-
untary servitude, such as Confederate flags. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTUALIZATION 
The Supreme Court countenances limitations on high school 
students’ expressive liberties that would otherwise be deemed 
unconstitutional if they were imposed on adults. Fleeting pro-
fanity, advocacy of illegal drug use, and journalism about repro-
duction are expressions whose contents, when uttered by adults, 
cannot be repressed absent a compelling government interest 
and narrow tailoring. But as demonstrated in Parts I and II, 
school administrators prohibit all these types of speech.221 The 
Court’s recent categorical deference to school officials chills stu-
dents who wish to express unorthodox or offensive ideas. Indeed, 
the degree of deference the Court gives to school administrative 
decision makers fails to exercise the judiciary’s role of identifying 
what constitutes protected speech. 
 
 221. See supra Parts I, II. 
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Courts typically take student vulnerability for granted as a 
justification for school restrictions,222 creating categories defer-
ential to authorities without adequately balancing them with the 
compelling constitutional interests in expression. Given the 
pragmatic needs of classrooms, part of the educator’s role is to 
maintain order, disallowing and punishing the use of vulgarities, 
insults, and other forms of harassing distractions. Where stu-
dents substantially and disruptively interfere with others’ learn-
ing experiences, teachers have a substantial interest in censor-
ing the manner and timing of outbursts. It is reasonable to 
expect younger learners to have different sensibilities than older 
high school students. Nevertheless, the First Amendment pro-
tects the ability to engage in political discussions irrespective of 
age. Classrooms and school auditoria are interactive forums 
where teachers direct education but leave space for students to 
develop civic consciousness by respectful expressions of sincerely 
held beliefs and ideas. So too, self-expression through art and 
humor are important for persons of all ages. Education at the 
grade school and high school levels traditionally drives students 
to discuss subjects with greater degrees of sophistication as they 
grow older, formulate opinions through close examinations of 
topics, dispel false information by open conversation, and learn 
more about themselves. 
A categorical approach that relies on age as a determinant 
of what speech is protected in classrooms and school hallways 
gives insufficient weight to the extent to which grade schools and 
high schools function as part of the cultural milieu of civic devel-
opment. The exercise of free speech has personal and social value 
at all levels of human development, from childhood to adulthood. 
As things stand, courts all too often find permissible restrictions 
burdening the expression of students’ viewpoints.223 The cate-
gorical method of adjudication discounts factors critical to the 
preservation of a flourishing learning environment conducive to 
student civic growth. A tiered approach to review school speech 
regulations will better protect students’ abilities to participate 
at school as citizens of a deliberative democracy, while giving 
 
 222. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) 
(discussing school officials’ expertise in identifying the emotional maturity of 
students); L.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ., 141 F. Supp. 3d 288, 296 (D.N.J. 
2015) (asserting that students are particularly vulnerability to harassment). 
 223. See, e.g., Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926 
(10th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e conclude that Hazelwood allows educators to make view-
point-based decisions about school-sponsored speech.”). 
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principals and teachers enough discretion in classrooms and dur-
ing other school events. 
To some degree, the treatment of student speech should be 
informed by the judicial treatment of public employees.224 
Though not entirely symmetrical, pertinent analytical similari-
ties exist between the two contexts. For example, using swear-
words can be grounds for adverse action against public employ-
ees225 without violating the First Amendment, just as it can 
against a student.226 Schools do not even violate the First 
Amendment for firing adult employees who advocate that stu-
dents ingest stimulants,227 but it is quite another thing to fire 
teachers who abstractly support the legalization of narcotics. 
Furthermore, where public employees make statements of public 
concern outside the employment setting, employers cannot rep-
rimand them for disrupting the workplace, for undermining dis-
cipline, or for harming harmonious employee interaction.228 Stu-
dent off-campus speech should likewise be treated as a matter 
for private concern when it does not substantially interfere with 
school discipline, teaching, and ordinary pedagogical functions. 
The analogy is, however, inexact despite the similarities be-
tween students and public university employees; universities 
are not mandated to retain untenured employees,229 and employ-
ees can quit whether or not they pursue alternative employ-
ment.230 Underage students, however, are statutorily required 
 
 224. See Nicole B. Cásarez, The Student Press, the Public Workplace, and 
Expanding Notions of Government Speech, 35 J.C. & U.L. 1, 7–26 (2008) (ex-
pounding on the “extent to which the First Amendment protects speech by pub-
lic school students on one hand, and public employees on the other, has devel-
oped along strikingly similar lines”). 
 225. Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584–86 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding an em-
ployee has no First Amendment right to use profanity in the classroom and com-
paring the decision to terminate to the school’s decision in Fraser). 
 226. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
 227. Schul v. Sherard, 102 F. Supp. 2d 877, 886 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (finding 
that high school’s interest in terminating an employee who promoted the use of 
caffeine among student athletes exceeded free speech interests of the offending 
coach). 
 228. Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 569–70, 572–73 (1968). 
 229. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 76 (3d ed. 2005) 
(“The American rule is that oral contracts of indefinite duration (the most com-
mon form of employment contract) are presumed to be ‘at will’ contracts.”). 
 230. The Thirteenth Amendment of United States prohibits forced labor. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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to attend schools for a legally defined number of years.231 And 
students are not unionized, while public employees bargain col-
lectively and strike, which in the case of teacher unions can 
cause disruptions in education.232 
Despite asymmetries, the Court’s public employee balancing 
doctrine can also be pertinent to the adjudication of disputes be-
tween school disciplinarians wanting to punish a perceived in-
fraction and students seeking to communicate controversial 
messages to others at and outside school. The free speech value 
of giving students adequate latitude to express themselves crea-
tively, politically, and descriptively coincides with the value of 
public employee expressions on those subjects. In neither case is 
the Free Speech Clause an absolute. In those circumstances 
when students and employees do not speak as citizens but re-
spectively as learners or public agents, the state can place rea-
sonable limitations on them without violating the First Amend-
ment. This suggested mode of analysis does not subject either 
category of speaker to the low rigor scrutiny that the Court relied 
on in Morse, Hazelwood, and Fraser. Instead, it requires nu-
anced adjudication of conflicting state and private interests. 
Rather than periodically treating student speech as a low-
value category warranting only ad hoc balancing and rational 
basis review, adjudication should be treated as part of a contin-
uum. All relevant factors—speech and administrative—should 
be reviewed and reflected in the judgment. This will inevitably 
boil down to contextual adjudication that takes into account gen-
eral First Amendment doctrine, free speech principles, as well as 
the particular circumstances of speech limitations—arising dur-
ing classwork, school politics, informal conversations, hallway 
banter, composition, classrooms, recess, and so forth. The pecu-
liar setting of primary and secondary schools will require some 
balance of free speech and pedagogy which are typically not per-
tinent with public employees, but concerns for education should 
not be excuses for the suppression of controversial ideas. 
Contexualization is a form of balancing that should include 
considerations of whether the student expression is protected by 
core First Amendment values. For example, students who speak 
 
 231. John R. Bunker, Check-Out Time at the Hotel California, 11 ST. JOHN’S 
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 137, 146 (1995) (providing citations to all fifty states’ com-
pulsory school laws). 
 232. See Randall W. Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teachers Unions and the Produc-
tivity of Public Schools, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 354, 361 (1987); Peggie R. 
Smith, Laboring for Child Care: A Consideration of New Approaches to Repre-
sent Low-Income Service Workers, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 583, 603–04 (2006). 
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of politics engage in conversations that help them grow as citi-
zens.233 And suppression of this form of expression—whether it 
concerns national, state, or school topics—would be particularly 
suspect because of the social value of civic participation and its 
relation to representative governance. On the other hand, it is 
within the power of administrators to discipline students for in-
tentionally violent or threatening statements which intrude the 
educational interests of students and pedagogues. Even where 
restrictions are justifiable under certain circumstances that pose 
a substantial disruption of schooling, the selected disciplinary 
measure should not be categorical but narrowly tailored to ad-
dress a pressing educational concern. A court would do better 
independently to engage in a sophisticated analysis of these fac-
tors, rather than reflexively relying on the expertise of school 
disciplinarians. Balancing considerations are relevant no matter 
which of the three traditional forms of scrutiny are applicable to 
a case.234 Nevertheless, administrators should have a more dif-
ficult threshold to clear in cases involving core speech about such 
matters as elections and an easier one where suspect expres-
sions, such as class bullying or ethnic slurs, are of little, if any, 
educational value. 
 
 233. See Joseph E. Kahne & Susan E. Sporte, Developing Citizens: The Im-
pact of Civic Learning Opportunities on Students’ Commitment to Civic Partici-
pation, 45 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 738 (2008) (describing an empirical study to prove 
that civic learning opportunities in high school improve students’ attitudes 
about civic involvement); Josh Pasek et al., Schools as Incubators of Democratic 
Participation: Building Long-Term Political Efficacy with Civic Education, 12 
APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 26, 26 (2008) (providing empirical support prov-
ing the effectiveness of high school on political socialization and suggesting the 
use of more targeted civic education). 
 234. See Richard C. Ausness, The Application of Product Liability Principles 
to Publishers of Violent or Sexually Explicit Material, 52 FLA. L. REV. 603, 641 
(2000) (“[C]ourts will normally uphold restrictions, or even complete prohibi-
tions, of low-value speech as long as the government can show a rational basis 
for its actions.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, A Grand Theory of Constitutional Law?, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 1249, 1249 n.5 (2002) (reviewing JEB RUBENFELD, FREEDOM 
AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001)) (“I see 
strict scrutiny as a form of balancing, with the weights on the scales being set 
against the government’s action.”); Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When 
Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 676–77 (2008) 
(“[I]ntermediate scrutiny expressly balances the government’s interests against 
the free speech interests at stake.”); Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach 
to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L. J. 917, 919 
(2009) (“Strict scrutiny can be seen as a form of balancing, but with a very strong 
thumb on the scale in favor of the speech interest.”). 
 2018] CATEGORIZING STUDENT SPEECH 1189 
 
B. CONTEXTUALIZING STUDENT SPEECH: THE NEED FOR STRICT 
SCRUTINY WHEN STUDENT SPEECH IS ABOUT POLITICS, 
PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT, OR THE EXPANSION OF KNOWLEDGE 
Students are civic and self-expressive players who contrib-
ute to the interpersonal life of schools by engaging classmates 
and teachers in political, social, artistic, and informative conver-
sations. Under ordinary circumstances, courts review limits on 
the content of speech using strict scrutiny judicial review.235 
While the school environment is a distinct setting for the ex-
change of ideas and experiences,236 student access to views and 
ideas allows them to be active and effective participants in plu-
ralist society, local communities, student organizations, and 
many other formal and informal associations.237 In practical 
terms, this means that schools should be subject to strict scru-
tiny analysis in cases where students are denied access to infor-
mation, such as when authorities remove books from library 
shelves perceived to be not in keeping with “orthodox” views “in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”238 
In educational settings, application of the strict scrutiny test 
requires some contextualization.239 A judge must ascertain (1) 
 
 235. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S.Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (relying on 
strict scrutiny to uphold a state bar rule against judicial candidates personally 
soliciting campaign funds); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 
(1988) (finding that even outrageous “political and social discourse” is constitu-
tionally protected form of viewpoint); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 188–89 
(1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the informative function of the 
press enjoys First Amendment protections). Courts rely on the strict scrutiny 
test to identify whether a content-based restriction on speech is “narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling government interest.” Pleasant Grove City v. Sum-
mum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). 
 236. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) 
(reviewing First Amendment considerations “in light of the special characteris-
tics of the school environment”). 
 237. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 
457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982) (asserting that access to information “prepares stu-
dents for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious 
society in which they will soon be adult members.”). 
 238. Id. at 872 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943)). 
 239. Stated more broadly, students have a right to gain meaningful infor-
mation without arbitrary school censorship. That is, there’s a difference be-
tween lesson plans formulated to be appropriate for students of a particular age 
and the suppression of ideas triggered by the suppression of information. This 
opens an important topic on the audience implications for students to the “right 
to receive ideas,” which is too much afield of this article but will need to be 
parsed at greater length in future work. See id. at 867 (“[T]he right to receive 
ideas follows ineluctably from the sender ’s First Amendment right to send  
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whether administrators censored information to suppress a 
viewpoint; (2) whether the regulation is of a type that is custom-
arily imposed for pedagogical purposes; (3) whether allowing stu-
dents to discuss the controversial ideas would advance their de-
liberative skills; (4) whether punishment was needed to advance 
education; and (5) whether something less onerous—such as dis-
cussion or debate—could have been imposed instead of suppres-
sion of speech. All these considerations are meant to balance so-
ciety’s interest in education with a student’s right to access and 
disseminate information.240 
Strict scrutiny signals the doctrinal presumption that a 
judge should strike official actions unless there is an overriding 
legal interest, such as national security, judicial neutrality, or 
electoral integrity.241 That is a high standard for schools to meet, 
but simply evaluating whether officials have a compelling reason 
to suppress student speech is too ambiguous. Consistency and 
predictability is well served by a greater certainty about the 
proper mode to analyze facts in the context of constitutional 
precedents. 
Historically, courts have been reluctant to rely on strict 
scrutiny assessment in the special circumstances of child and ad-
olescent education.242 Their hesitancy is born of the reality of ed-
ucation. Besides the acquisition of knowledge, discipline is es-
sential to the dissemination of information, culture, and 
discipline to young learners. Schools cannot be treated as tradi-
tional public forums because maintaining a successful learning 
environment ordinarily requires educators to quell student dis-
ruptions and to forbid mischievous behaviors, reward positive 
 
them . . . .”); see also Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 
377 n.39 (2014). 
 240. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 241. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665–66 (2015) (implying 
the Humanitarian Law Project holding was based on strict scrutiny); id. at 1666 
(plurality relying on strict scrutiny to uphold a content-based campaign solici-
tation restriction on judicial candidates); id. at 1676 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ac-
cepting plurality’s claim that strict scrutiny applies, but disagreeing that the 
state met its burden); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 
(2010) (applying “more rigorous” than intermediate scrutiny); Burson v. Free-
man, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion upholding a distance re-
striction for campaigning near a campaign booth on the date of election). 
 242. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) 
(“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment, are available to teachers and students.”). 
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behaviors, and rely on pedagogical techniques for students to 
succeed.243  
The need to maintain order in the classroom does not dimin-
ish students’ interests in challenging and articulating positions 
about controversial matters, such as the illegality of narcotics. 
Without seriously reflecting on the political nature of drug-re-
lated protests, the Court in Morse discounted a student’s ability 
to express opposition to laws criminalizing the use of mariju-
ana;244 although, that is clear viewpoint discrimination. 
Classrooms should be treated similarly to nonpublic forums, 
where administrators can use reasonable and neutral criteria, 
such as their places of residency or test scores for enrollment and 
curriculum purposes, but cannot resort to viewpoint discrimina-
tion.245 This is not to say that schools have no role in the devel-
opment of childhood character, civility, and temperance. To the 
contrary, as Amy Gutmann points out, “The aim of cultivating 
good character authorizes teachers to respect only a limited 
range of values professed . . . by children. Indiscriminate respect 
for children’s values cannot be defended either as an ultimate 
end or as a tenable means to cultivating good character.”246 Nev-
ertheless, when students express controversial views, whether 
about something at the level of national politics or about their 
own school, differences with the administration should not be 
stymied, suppressed, or punished but engaged, answered, and 
appraised. 
Schools are not, however, quintessential nonpublic forums 
“[w]here the government is” simply “acting as a proprietor, man-
aging its internal operations.”247 Unlike airports or government 
 
 243. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague 
Letter on the Nondiscriminatory Administration of School Discipline (Jan. 8, 
2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi 
.html (“Many schools have adopted comprehensive, appropriate, and effective 
programs demonstrated to: (1) reduce disruption and misconduct; (2) support 
and reinforce positive behavior and character development; and (3) help stu-
dents succeed.”). 
 244. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 440 (2007). 
 245. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 64 
(1983) (“[W]hatever the right of public authorities to impose content-based re-
strictions on access to government property that is a nonpublic forum, once ac-
cess is granted to one speaker to discuss a certain subject access may not be 
denied to another speaker based on his viewpoint.”). 
 246. GUTMANN, supra note 1, at 56. 
 247. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 
(1992). Alan Brownstein argues that public schools should be treated as non-
public forums. As he points out, “hallways, school yards, and lunch rooms of 
public schools have not been deliberately opened up by school authorities for 
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office buildings, schools are organized to enhance students’ abil-
ities to deliberate, analyze, ascertain, reflect, and share ideas. 
The Tinker test recognizes the unique pedagogical settings of K–
12 education. Educators can rely on content-neutral, time, place, 
and manner considerations; however, within the parameters of 
a specific class or an educational program, any further rules 
must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.248 Strict scrutiny 
should apply to the suppression of students’ viewpoints. While 
teachers need the latitude to supervise lesson plans and prevent 
students from disrupting learning in the classroom and on the 
playground, students should be allowed freely to voice ideas, 
facts, and views absent a compelling state interest. It is reason-
able for teachers or administrators to require students to stay on 
topic in class, rather than interrupting about irrelevant subjects 
 
unfettered discussion and debate any more than the foyers and hallways of most 
government buildings have been opened up for unfettered discussion and de-
bate.” Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bring-
ing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored 
Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 731 (2009). 
It may also be argued that schools are limited public forums. Justice 
Blackmun takes the latter position in a dissenting argument. Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 829 (1985) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that Tinker established a limited public forum test for 
public school regulation). It is no wonder that in the same passage, Blackmun 
expresses a concern that nonpublic forum analysis to schools would collapse the 
distinction between limited public forum and nonpublic forum. Id. The Court 
indeed uses the same test for both types of forums. See also Good News Club v. 
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (asserting that in limited courts 
test whether a restriction on communication is reasonable and non-viewpoint 
specific); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 
392–93 (1993) (“With respect to public property that is not a designated public 
forum open for indiscriminate public use for communicative purposes, we have 
said that ‘[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject 
matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in 
light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.’” (quoting 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). In 
fact, in a recent dissent from a denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas appeared to 
disavow the doctrinal distinctions between the two. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative 
v. King Cty., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1022 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If the gov-
ernment creates a limited public forum (also called a nonpublic forum)—
namely, ‘a forum that is limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to 
the discussion of certain subjects’—then speech restrictions need only be ‘rea-
sonable and viewpoint neutral.’” (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 
555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009)). It strikes me, however, that nonpublic forum charac-
terizes a broader set of locations, while limited public forum refers to specific 
locations, like library study rooms or school auditoria, reserved for specific in-
dividuals or organizations. 
 248. Hastings Christian Fellowship v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) 
(stating that “restrictions on access to a limited public forum . . . must be rea-
sonable and viewpoint neutral”). 
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that would disrupt fellow students. However, the First Amend-
ment prohibits administrators from censoring students com-
municating unorthodox views to teachers, principals, and class-
mates. 
The Supreme Court has failed to give adequate weight to 
student speech, countenancing overt viewpoint restrictions on 
speech about drugs,249 abortion, and pregnancy.250 This ap-
proach treats student speech as of some low-order category, ex-
ternal to the First Amendment, much as incitement or child por-
nography. This approach is entirely incongruous with the 
Court’s prohibition of viewpoint discrimination absent compel-
ling state interest and narrow tailoring. Justices have increas-
ingly construed the significance of schools’ special expressive 
characteristics as a rationale to attribute a low value to student 
communications.251 The deference the Court has shown schools 
in the last three decades has short-shifted the intellectual and 
political growth and sophistication of children as they progress 
through grade school and high school.252 Moreover, lower courts 
should differentiate between speech causing non-educational 
disruptions, such as threats made on school playgrounds,253 and 
others causing political disturbances, such as speech about con-
troversial subjects such as grading standards and purported rac-
ism.254 
The Court’s trend to treat student speech as having a low 
value runs counter to my proposed heightened level of scrutiny 
for viewpoint restrictions on student speech. The Court’s re-
peated deference to school officials in cases like Morse, recog-
nized the need for sufficient flexibility to allow officials to deter 
 
 249. Morse, 551 U.S. at 393. 
 250. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
 251. See Frank D. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students Are “Persons” Un-
der Our Constitution—Except When They Aren’t, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1348 
(2009) (criticizing “the extraordinary deference that is afforded to administra-
tors in managing school affairs and the relatively low value afforded to the 
speech of young people”). 
 252. Amy Gutmann, What Is the Value of Free Speech for Students?, 29 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 519, 523 (1997) (“[L]aws governing free speech in schools should in-
creasingly respect the free speech rights of students varied by age.”). 
 253. S.G. ex rel. A.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d 417, 423 (3rd Cir. 
2003) (declining to differentiate under what circumstances a school may violate 
an elementary school student’s freedom of speech rights). 
 254. Baxter v. Vigo Cty. Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 736–38 (7th Cir. 1994) (up-
holding a principal’s qualified immunity against a law suit challenging the pun-
ishment of a student for wearing a t-shirt to protest grades and racism). 
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and punish disciplinary breakdowns. Yet, the judiciary some-
times bows to speculative claims, unsupported by evidence, such 
as the notions that the “BONG HITS 4 JESUS” poster would en-
tice children to experiment with drugs255 or that the demand to 
hold a music festival earlier in the school year might cause dis-
ruption.256 
The Supreme Court’s lack of exacting scrutiny empowers 
school suppression of controversial ideas.257 As explained in Part 
II, several lower court decisions have followed recent Supreme 
Court student speech precedents by adopting rational basis re-
view of school disciplinary measures. This approach is consistent 
with the deferential review of low value categories in Stevens, 
Alvarez, and Entertainment Merchants. 
In Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse, the Court granted schools 
authority to regulate content of student speech without a rigor-
ous framework against discretionary viewpoint discrimination. 
As Mary-Rose Papandrea has explained: 
 [T]o the extent the Court’s school speech jurisprudence is based on the 
“special circumstances” of the school environment—and not on the age 
of their students—it must at bottom rest on the sense that schools have 
a mission, and that offering students full speech rights would interfere 
with that mission.258 
 Speculation about the possibility of disruption or even ille-
gality is insufficient reason to abridge speech in a setting meant 
to expose children to democratic deliberation, tolerance, infor-
mation, free thought, wisdom, and alternative perspectives. Ra-
ther than emphasizing the obvious value of speech to social de-
velopment, the judicial trend has become to emphasize discipline 
to the detriment of expression. Instead of taking a hands-off ap-
proach, courts should rigorously safeguard student speech, ab-
sent specific evidence of the substantial disruption that Tinker 
set as an exception to the general latitude to student communi-
cations. Expressing controversial viewpoints has never been con-
sidered disruptive in other areas of free speech jurisprudence, 
and this principle should apply to young citizens. 
Rather than a categorical acceptance of school administra-
tors’ decisions, courts should use contexualized analysis in adju-
 
 255. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 4398–99 (2007). 
 256. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 257. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–91 (1992) (discussing historically 
unprotected categories of speech and finding that the First Amendment gener-
ally prohibits viewpoint discrimination). 
 258. Papandrea, supra note 1.  
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dicating student speech cases that involve core First Amend-
ment values. While the classroom requires discipline commen-
surate with age and learning environments, students should be 
free to vent ideas about politics, art, and even the sciences within 
and without the school walls. Inevitably, young learners will ex-
press many false ideas, but school is a great marketplace of ideas 
for setting them aright. First Amendment protection of view-
points is not a shield against bad grades for poorly reasoned, ar-
ticulated, or unsupported school work. In an educational envi-
ronment, some limitations are necessary to maintain classroom 
discipline, advance knowledge, and evaluate quality; however, in 
school settings outside the classroom, such as lunchrooms and 
playgrounds, discussions on controversial subjects should typi-
cally be free of censure because of the civic values involved. On 
the other hand, where the suppression of content is only coinci-
dental to school time, place, or manner regulations (such as rules 
on noise in lunch rooms or length of class periods) or the regula-
tion of conduct (such as on disruptive classroom antics), courts 
should be more deferential to administrators. I propose a bal-
anced method to respect the value of student engagement in cre-
ative and political thought while also being cognizant that with-
out supervision many K–12 classrooms will likely deteriorate 
into a free-for-all. 
Nevertheless, rather than treating student speech as a low-
value category, unworthy of close judicial scrutiny, the Court 
should use sophisticated judicial review. Students function in 
various environments while they are at school and school-related 
activities. In certain circumstances their abilities to deliberate 
on public matters is on a par with any other citizen’s. This is 
particularly true where student communications are political, 
artistic, or self-assertive. On the other hand, content neutral ed-
ucational restrictions are necessary to advance pedagogical 
goals. And as a government actor in a representative democracy, 
it is legitimate, indeed necessary, for the school to promulgate 
pluralism and tolerance in school and society at large. 
C. CONFLICTING CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS: THE CASE OF 
CONFEDERATE SYMBOLS 
The balancing test will sometimes require judicial weighing 
of conflicting constitutional interests. Students’ right to free 
speech is not absolute, and sometimes their communications 
raise competing legal concerns. There is no First Amendment 
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justification for harassment.259 This is not only based on norms 
of civility but constitutional and statutory provisions. This sec-
tion of the Article articulates how the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
grant of authority to punish student displays of the badges of 
slavery and the statutory mandate to prevent educational har-
assments balances against speakers’ First Amendment inter-
ests. 
1. The Thirteenth Amendment and the Badges of Slavery 
and Involuntary Servitude 
Schools are authorized to enforce rules predicated on consti-
tutional norms, even in some narrow contexts where competing 
interests limit student speech. Illustrative of this point are cases 
that deal with students who challenge school punishments for 
wearing Confederate logos. Such symbolism is semantically and 
historically connected with the badges of slavery and involun-
tary servitude.260 
The popular symbol for the Confederate flag is based on the 
St. Andrew’s Cross.261 It was the battle flag of the Confederacy 
and communicated support for a secessionist rebellion, fought to 
defend the institution of slavery. In the mid-twentieth century, 
segregationists proudly waived the Confederate flag as a state-
ment opposing the holding in Brown v. Board of Education that 
separate-but-equal public school education violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.262 Schools have a special obligation to prevent 
 
 259. Cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at, 410 (1992) (White, J., concurring) (stating that 
the First Amendment does not protect the perpetrators of workplace harass-
ment); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1363, 1364 
(10th Cir. 2000) (finding due process to have been satisfied in the punishment 
of a middle school student who drew Confederate flag against school anti-har-
assment policy). 
 260. See Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thir-
teenth Amendment Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539 (2002). 
 261. MARC HOWARD ROSS, CULTURAL CONTESTATION IN ETHNIC CONFLICT 
286 (2007); Gerald R. Webster & Jonathan I. Leib, Fighting for the Lost Cause: 
The Confederate Battle Flag and Neo-Confederacy, in NEO-CONFEDERACY: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 173 (Euan Hague et al. eds., 2008). 
 262. See LAWRENCE BLUM, “I’M NOT A RACIST, BUT . . .”: THE MORAL QUAN-
DARY OF RACE (2002);WILLIAM PENCAK, CONTESTED COMMONWEALTHS: ESSAYS 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 334 (2011) (recounting that in the 1950s and 1970s “the 
state flags of Georgia (1956) and South Carolina (1963) incorporated the Con-
federate Battle Flag . . . an action taken by their legislature explicitly to support 
segregation as well as to honor the Confederacy”); John Walker Davis, An Air 
of Defiance: Georgia’s State Flag Change of 1956, 82 GA. HIST. Q. 305, 317 (1998) 
(relating the uses of Confederate flag in Georgia as a rallying symbol against 
desegregation); Chris Springer, The Troubled Resurgence of the Confederate 
Flag, HISTORY TODAY (1993) (discussing symbolic features of the Confederate 
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on-campus advocacy in support of violent, hateful ideology, such 
as the one that supports a symbol historically referent of slavery 
and involuntary servitude.263 
Several circuits have reviewed public school punishments or 
suspensions of students for wearing clothes containing Confed-
erate symbolism.264 In Defoe v. Spiva, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a Tennessee school 
board’s ban against wearing Confederate symbols at school.265 
The majority reviewed the board’s determination that displaying 
a symbol at a school with decades of racial tension was likely to 
disrupt and materially interfere with school activities.266 The 
court stated that the school could regulate display of that “con-
troversial racial and political symbol.”267 Speech was not the 
only constitutional interest at stake in the case. The circuit court 
failed to evaluate the First Amendment issues in the context of 
alternative Thirteenth Amendment values. It should have clari-
fied how schools, their boards, and teachers can invoke objective 
criteria for identifying why Confederate symbols are particularly 
disruptive in light of the nation’s history, not only in terms of 
existing exigencies. The school’s duty to provide equal educa-
tional opportunities and to prevent school harassment under Ti-
tle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964268 legitimized the admin-
istration’s decision to prohibit students from wearing the symbol 
of slavery to school. 
 
flag) http://www.historytoday.com/chris-springer/troubled-resurgence 
-confederateflag. 
 263. Tsesis, supra note 260, at 543 (discussing the cultural significance of 
Confederate symbols placed on state property). See also Julie Novkov, The Thir-
teenth Amendment and the Meaning of Familial Bonds, 71 MD. L. REV. 203, 215 
(2011) (arguing that a “potential contemporary interpretation of badges of slav-
ery . . . is the use of Confederate signs and symbols as a means of expressing a 
hostile agenda toward African-Americans”). 
 264. See, e.g., A.M. ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 223 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he racially inflammatory meaning associated with the Confederate flag and 
the evidence of racial tension at BHS establish that defendants reasonably fore-
cast that the proscribed speech might cause substantial disruption of school ac-
tivities.”); B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 741 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that evidence of prior “racially-motivated violence, racial tension, and 
other altercations directly related to adverse race relations in the community 
and the school” justified school district’s ban on Confederate symbols in school). 
 265. Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 266. Id. at 334. 
 267. Id. at 336 (quoting Castorina v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 
542 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 268. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). 
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Preventing the use of Confederate symbolism at school is 
one of those rare cases in which government has a compelling 
interest to suppress cultural or political statements.269 Confed-
erate symbols are insignia with a distinct history that signal vi-
olence and oppression. The Confederate battle flag was a call to 
arms, to protect the institution of slavery and racial subordina-
tion.270 Human bondage was not the only evil of slavery. In the 
Old South, blacks were also denied an education and even pro-
hibited from learning how to read.271 The Confederate flag, 
therefore, is also a statement against equal, desegregated edu-
cation. 
Admittedly, not all people understand it that way and con-
troversy exists about the meaning of the Confederate flag. While 
some would agree that it is a symbol of the badges and incidents 
of slavery, such as educational inequality, others believe it sym-
bolizes only benign Southern culture.272 Nevertheless, the fact 
that there is a relevant constitutional provision empowering gov-
ernment to prohibit the uses of badges and incidents of slavery, 
makes the situation unique. Matters are of course different if the 
flag is displayed in a historical text or school museum, where it 
is part of a narrative of past events. And courts should examine 
the context of the challenged display. 
 
 269. The seminal case of a compelling government interest in suppressing 
political speech upheld a ban on electioneering within one hundred feet of a 
polling station on the day of elections. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 
(1992). 
 270. See James Forman, Jr., Note, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Con-
federate Flag from Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505, 513 (1991) (de-
scribing how the Confederate Flag was meant to rally soldiers to battle). 
 271. Theodore Weld, in 1839, exclaimed that enslaved parents had “as little 
control over [their children] as have domestic animals over the disposal of their 
young.” THEODORE D. WELD, AMERICAN SLAVERY AS IT IS 56 (Arno Press 1968) 
(1839). Slave parents were particularly restrained from educating their chil-
dren. Indeed, many states forbade slaves from receiving any form of education, 
even though some blacks learned clandestinely with the help of sympathetic or 
self-interested whites. Concerning African American resourcefulness in using 
linguistic skills to elevate themselves from slavery and cultural prejudices, see 
Kimberly Rae Connor, To Disembark: The Slave Narrative Tradition, 30 AFR. 
AM. REV. 35, 36 (1996); Joyce E. Williams & Ron Ladd, On the Relevance of 
Education for Black Liberation, 47 J. NEGRO EDUC. 266 (1978). In the South, 
general education for blacks began only in 1861 in Fortress Monroe, Virginia. 
Ellis O. Knox, A Historical Sketch of Secondary Education for Negroes, 9 J. NE-
GRO EDUC. 440, 445 (1940). 
 272. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 
2262 (2015) (asserting that some wave the Confederate battle flag “to evoke the 
memory of their ancestors and other soldiers who fought for the South in the 
Civil War,” while “[t]o others, it symbolizes slavery, segregation, and hatred”). 
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School officials’ actions are warranted in those cases where 
students laud the Confederacy because, at least part of the stu-
dent body, will not only take offense but is also likely to become 
violently angered, alienated, or harassed by school authorities’ 
toleration of the symbol’s display.273 In their effort to advance 
civic responsibility in students and inculcating the antidiscrimi-
nation value of the Reconstruction Amendments, education ad-
ministrators can legitimately find that wearing a Confederate t-
shirt or flying a Confederate flag while on school grounds or dur-
ing school activities undermines the lessons of civil equality in-
culcated into our federal government by the constitutional pro-
hibition of slavery and its badges and incidents.274 
An elaborate Fourth Circuit discussion, in Hardwick v. Hey-
ward, examined the enforcement of a South Carolina school dis-
trict’s dress code, which forbade students from wearing “any-
thing . . . deemed to be offensive,” such as drug advocacy or 
alcohol advertisements.275 Even though that policy did not spe-
cifically mention Confederate symbols, officials repeatedly 
warned a student to abide by a ban of Confederate symbols.276 
After receiving explicit warnings from school officials, a student 
was suspended, and her parents subsequently brought a cause 
of action on First Amendment and Equal Protection grounds.277 
School officials answered that the policy and disciplinary 
measures were needed because of the disruptive nature of the 
symbol and past racial conflicts at the plaintiff ’s school. As with 
Defoe, the Hardwick circuit court relied on Tinker, finding that 
“school officials could reasonably forecast that all of these Con-
 
 273. See Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 2010) (up-
holding the decision of school to suspend student wearing clothing with Confed-
erate symbol in part based on testimony of school official that “displays of the 
Confederate flag would be a distraction to any student offended by it and could 
result in some sort of dangerous disagreement resulting in conflict or violence”); 
Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that a school’s ban of 
Confederate symbols in school did not violate the First Amendment because of-
ficials foresaw disruptions and the school’s principal saw “the confederate flag 
as both offensive and disruptive”). 
 274. See Denno v. Sch. Bd., 218 F.3d 1267, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding 
that educators could prohibit the use of Confederate symbols at schools to ad-
vance lessons of civility, in keeping with the Supreme Court’s holding in Fraser). 
 275. Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 430 (4th Cir. 
2013). 
 276. Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 674 F. Supp. 2d 725, 729 (D.S.C. 
2009). 
 277. Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick, 711 F.3d at 430–32. 
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federate flag shirts” she had worn “would materially and sub-
stantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”278 Offi-
cials were not required to wait until there was an actual disrup-
tion but could “reasonably forecast” its likelihood and act 
accordingly. The court did not treat the school regulation as a 
categorical limitation on low-value statements; instead, the 
court used a sophisticated analysis of the contextual type I have 
proposed in this Article to identify a likely disruption. In addi-
tion to its review of conflicting speech and educational interests, 
the history of the Confederate symbol, and the effect of the policy 
on the general welfare of the school, the Hardwick court also 
found the dress code to be neither overbroad nor vague. But the 
Court overlooked the relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment in 
ascertaining the validity of restricting student’s speech to ad-
vance the compelling constitutional value of interracial tranquil-
ity in school. Contextual balancing of constitutional interests can 
help schools maintain educational environments where so pow-
erful a badge of slavery is outside the pale of decency. 
Contrary to my perspective, Professor Catherine Ross takes 
the view that Confederate flag displays should be treated as or-
dinary political speech under the Tinker standard.279 From her 
perspective, “What the Confederate flag meant to those who 
waved it in the late 1860s might not be what it means to individ-
uals who display it have a century later.”280 To the contrary, I 
believe the Confederate symbol is permanently connected to the 
slave supporting culture from which it became the standard for 
battle against the Union. Its expression of states’ rights is bound 
to the political outlook that encouraged state governments to 
permanently safeguard the institution of slavery. The same is 
true of other symbols of destructive regimes: the swastika has a 
permanent connection with Nazis, the hammer and sickle refers 
to the Bolshevik regime, and the ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria) flag is connected to the demand of a radical Islamic cali-
phate. These are not merely emblems of historical moments. In-
deed, when they are depicted in a history book, in a transparency 
shown in journalism class, or a newspaper article handed out 
during a roundtable of a contemporary issues course, all of these 
flags are protected speech. Certainly having a Confederate sym-
bol display in a textbook, a poster presentation, or some other 
 
 278. Id. at 438. 
 279. CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW SCHOOLS AND 
COURTS SUBVERT STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 184 (2015). 
 280. Id. at 183. 
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educational setting are protected aspects of the First Amend-
ment marketplace of ideas. They are relevant to the exchange of 
ideas in the academic setting. It is when they are worn on t-
shirts, drawn, hung on lockers, printed on school newspaper 
logos, and used in advocacy contexts that they bring to mind the 
heinous ideologies of those regimes. Where Confederate flags are 
depicted in schools outside the educational process, administra-
tors can ban them pursuant to the principles of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 
Ross’s point, nevertheless, brings to mind an important in-
sight: context matters. Not all Confederate displays are likely to 
be harassing enough to disrupt education. Unless Confederate 
symbols are persistently or pervasively on display at a school, it 
is unlikely that a court would find the harassment to be pre-
sent.281 Requiring proof of educational disruption before enforc-
ing a policy prohibiting the display of Confederate symbols cre-
ates an objective standard, one that can be tested against facts 
on the ground, rather than on the basis of a subjective heckler’s 
veto, predicated on hypersensitive students.282 
2 Harassment Statutes and Hate Messages 
Administrators are presented with a separate set of legal 
concerns when confronting students who appear at school-spon-
sored activities wearing clothes displaying hate messages uncon-
nected to Confederate symbols. A student may, for instance, 
dress in a shirt with a swastika; a degrading statement charac-
terizing homosexuals as pedophiles; or a genocidal message, 
such as, “The Only Good Indian Is a Dead Indian.” In those cir-
cumstances, federal law should define the extent to which prin-
cipals or teachers can maintain discipline without infringing on 
the First Amendment rights of students. 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 obligates recipients 
of federal educational subsidies to maintain environments where 
 
 281. Cf. Atkins v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., No. C04-5779RBL, 2005 WL 
1356261, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 7, 2005) (stating that under federal law pro-
hibiting discrimination in education settings, actionable conduct must be per-
sistent, pervasive, or severe). 
 282. See Whitfield v. Notre Dame Middle Sch., 412 F. App’x 517, 521 (3rd 
Cir. 2011). 
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students are not subject to racism, color preferences, or xenopho-
bia.283 Title VI enjoins recipients from operating institutions 
where “harassing conduct (e.g., physical, verbal, graphic, or writ-
ten) . . . is sufficiently severe, pervasive or persistent so as to in-
terfere with or limit the ability of an individual to participate in 
or benefit from the services, activities or privileges provided by 
a recipient.”284 A school engaging in discrimination or failing to 
reasonably investigate and respond to notifications of hostility 
can be found liable.285 The school might directly receive notice of 
harassment (as by letter or oral communication with a school 
agent) or indirectly (as by media report).286 In some cases the 
“pervasiveness, persistence, or severity of the racial harassment 
may be enough to infer that the recipient had notice of the hostile 
environment.”287 
Not all expressions of derogatory “views, words, symbols or 
thoughts that some person finds offensive” are actionable.288 
However, displaying hate symbolism and messages at school 
goes beyond mere offensiveness. Displays of degrading, geno-
cidal, or dehumanizing symbolism constitute harassment that is 
unprotected by the First Amendment. Intimidating, threaten-
ing, and coercive educational harassment interferes with stu-
dents’ abilities to study. It can interfere with students’ progress 
through hallways, limit their participation in curricular and af-
ter-school activities, intimidate them from joining clubs, or lead 
to truancy. 
Harassing interference with education is analogous to work-
place harassment, where hostility can impede job perfor-
mance.289 In the workplace setting, the free speech claim is such 
a nonstarter that even when the parties briefed the question, the 
Supreme Court refused to reach the issue.290 Harassment in the 
 
 283. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). The statute extends to members of religious 
groups. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (“[V]ictims of discrim-
ination on the basis of race, religion, or national origin have had private Title 
VI remedies available at least since 1965.”). 
 284. Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational In-
stitutions, Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11,448, 11,449 (Mar. 10, 1994). 
 285. Id. at 11,450. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 243. 
 289. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 92 
(2009) (stating that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act protects against discrimi-
nation of employment opportunities based on race and gender). 
 290. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and 
the First Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13 (asserting 
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workplaces and schools targets captive audiences; under those 
circumstances, officials are granted greater discretion to create 
time, place, and manner restrictions against severe, pervasive, 
or persistent discriminatory expressions, such as pro-Nazi homo-
phobic, and anti-Indian emblems.291 If a school fails to act 
against pervasive and severe racist harassment, Title VI grants 
the Justice Department or Department of Education the author-
ity to intervene and pursue remedies. 
  CONCLUSION   
In recent years, courts have increasingly deferred to public 
school authorities in student speech cases. This trend has dimin-
ished the scope, thoroughness, and rigor of judicial review, treat-
ing certain forms of student speech as low value categories un-
worthy of First Amendment protections. This precedential shift 
in K–12 has empowered administrators to punish students who 
express controversial points of view about matters such as preg-
nancy, abortion, and illegal drugs. Some courts have even re-
fused to engage in First Amendment review of school punish-
ments for student speech made off campus on social media. That 
tends to chill student communications about matters like stu-
dent government, events, community, and maturation. 
School is too important a locus for deliberation, petition, and 
assembly to leave decisions negatively impacting students’ free 
speech rights at the sole discretion of administrators. Student 
speech is essential to the development of individuals and the 
flourishing of civic society. Courts should therefore review 
whether a school suppressed speech because of the student’s ex-
pressed political, artistic, or scientific viewpoint. Speech re-
strictions on core First Amendment values and uttered outside 
the school should warrant strict scrutiny review, but where 
statements are communicated during school sponsored activities 
 
that “the Supreme Court’s failure to notice a First Amendment question would 
signal its unanimous view that there was no question to be noticed—a judgment 
that the prohibited category was so clearly unrelated to the First Amendment’s 
purposes that it should not be dignified with an explanation as to why it consti-
tuted an ‘exception’”). Compare Brief for Respondent at 31, Harris v. Forklift 
Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (No. 92-1168), 1993 WL 302223 (briefing First 
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 291. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., No. 96-2181-JWL, 1997 WL 292123, 
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judges should rely on a contextually rich time, place, and man-
ner analysis. 
